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This study tries to address a research question on what effects Chinese
patriotic education has on Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan. The question is
raised from a recent discussion on the issue of whether the “patriotic education
campaign” since 1989 has led to anti-Japanese sentiments in China.
Guided by the research question, this study particularly looks at the impacts
of patriotic education in schools on Chinese students’ perceptions of Japan.
While aware of the theoretical arguments and the focus on Chinese historical
narrative of Japan in previous research, this study instead serves as an empirical
examination on the topic and emphasizes the importance of students’ reactions in
determining the effects of Chinese patriotic and history education in schools.
This study thus is primarily based on the empirical data collected from
fieldworks and surveys. Comparative and content analyses were also employed
to examine relevant official documents and the history textbooks in secondary
schools.
Based on these empirical and comparative examinations, this study on the
one hand concludes that the historical narrative of Japan in Chinese patriotic
curriculum, though it has been more negative than positive, has been consistent
since 1989, when the Chinese government attempted to reform and strengthen its
patriotic education and emphasized on the history of the “Chinese humiliation
century.” In addition, a more comprehensive view of Japan has been introduced
to students with a reformed history curriculum since 2001. This study, on the
other hand, also discovers that nowadays Chinese youths tend to perceive Japan
in a multi-faceted and rational way, that their understandings of Japan and
Sino-Japanese relations are not necessarily identical with the historical narrative
of Japan presented in the school patriotic curriculum, and that Chinese youths
today tend to resist the message likely embedded with the political-ideological
indoctrination in the school curriculum. Due to the stronger influences from the
Internet and other mass media, the conflicting effects of textbooks and teachers
as well as Chinese students’ superficial receptions and “digestion” of the
information from schools, this study reveals the weak effects of Chinese patriotic
education on Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1. Background and Literature Reviews
The last two decades have seen large-scale street demonstrations and online
petitions against Japan across Mainland China, although economic exchanges, on the
other hand, have boomed between China and Japan. 1 Nationwide anti-Japanese
protests in 1996, 2003, 2005 and 2010, for example, were highly visible cases. There
were also large-scale demonstrations against the United States and other western
countries by Chinese living inside and outside mainland China in the last two
decades, for instance, the nationwide demonstrations against the United States in
response to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing of the Chinese
embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and the demonstrations against western counties in
response to Tibet issues and western media bias during the Beijing Olympic torch
relay in 2008. Nonetheless, street demonstrations and online petitions against Japan
have been much more consistently visible.
The last two decades similarly have seen Chinese holding consistently negative
attitudes toward Japan. As showed by public opinion polls concluded by both China
and Japan since 1988, Chinese perceptions of Japan have been consistently negative
since the mid-1990s (Kobayashi 2008).Triggered by different disputes and incidental
events, as we saw, the frequent street demonstrations and online petitions against
Japan in China usually involved Chinese youths in their 20s as major participants
(Wang 2009: 800).
Why do Chinese still harbor consistently negative feelings toward Japan while
older generations, who had direct experiences of the war and occupation, have been
passing away and the younger generation has grown up with all kinds of Japanese
products and Japanese cultural influences in their lives? Why have large-scale street

1

According to the figures drawn from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the value of the mutual
trade between China and Japan had grown from $12 billion in 1990 to $83 billion in 2000 when it
accounted for more than 22% of China's total trade in 2000. Also, according to the latest report released
by Japan External Trade Organization, compared to 2010 Japan’s total trade with China rose 14.3% to
US$344.9 billion in 2011, setting a new record. This number is expected to a reach record high
exceeding US$350 billion in 2012. See http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/news/releases/20120223142-news,
accessed in Feb. 2, 2012.
1

demonstrations and online petitions against Japan frequently occurred across
Mainland China in the past two decades despite increased economic and social
exchanges between China and Japan?
Explorations of these questions bring about extensive discussions and in-depth
analyses on Chinese perceptions of Japan and Sino-Japanese relations from different
perspectives. Among those discussions and analyses, two main arguments can be
broadly concluded. While one suggests that Chinese anti-Japanese sentiments (if
there are any) are deliberately disseminated by the Chinese government for or
through promoting nationalism, the other argues that anti-Japanese sentiments in
China (if there are any) are deeply embedded within historical trauma and current
disputes rather than being a product of manipulation.2
Given China’s rise as an economic, political, and military power, as has been
argued by many scholars, the last two decades have coincided with a resurgence of
Chinese nationalism through a nationwide “patriotic education campaign” across
mainland China. 3 The “patriotic education campaign” launched by the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) in the early 1990s, which emphasizes the traumatic
experiences mainly resulting from the invasion by Japan during China’s “humiliation
century” and the CCP’s contributions to riding China and its people of the
humiliation, especially of Japan’s invasion, is thus believed to be aimed at promoting
Chinese (Chinese youths in particular) nationalist feelings toward Japan, so as to
legitimize the CCP regime and sustain social stability.4
This argument, as Japanese scholar Shogo Suzuki (2007) concluded, is
increasingly popular in the context of a legitimacy crisis of the CCP within China in
the late 1980s. It also strongly relies on the assumption that Chinese nationalism is
rooted in China’s wartime past and that the Chinese leadership is capable of
strategically utilizing historical memory to suit its interests. On the heels of these
assumptions, both politicians and scholars believe that Chinese patriotic education
serves as a pragmatic tool to nurture anti-Japanese sentiments among Chinese,

2

For the first point of view, see, for example, Callahan (2006, 2007); Gries (2005); He (2007, 2009);
Mitter (2000); Zhao (1998, 2004). For the second point of view, see, for example, Liu (2007); Jiang
(2005); Wang (2008); Suzuki (2007).
3
There have been a number of surveys on the rise of Chinese nationalism, see, for examples, Gries
(2004); Hughes (2006); Whiting (1995); Zheng (1999) and etc.
4
For this view, see especially Zhao Suisheng’ s works (1998, 2004). Also see, for example, Barme
(1995); Callahan (2006); Chen (2005); Cohen (2002); He (2007); Gries (2005).
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especially Chinese youths.5
When large-scale anti-Japanese protests burst out across Mainland China in
2005, Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura at that time connected
China’s anti-Japanese sentiments with China’s history-based education, claiming
China should ‘‘modify’’ its education concerning history. He also cited, “a survey
released by Japan’s Asahi Shimbun in April 2005 indicated that more than 80% of
Japanese respondents believed that China’s nationalistic education system
encouraged Chinese anti-Japanese protests” (Los Angeles Times, 8 May 2005). This
argument actually had existed in Japan much earlier. From 27 February to 23 March
2001, for example, a Japanese newspaper Sankei Shimbun carried a series of
twenty-one articles on the teaching of history in China, offering detailed support for
what many had been writing: the Chinese leadership buttress growing nationalism by
presenting Japanese history more negatively and stirring public opinion towards
increased animosity (Rozman 2002: 119). Almost ten years later when the boat
collision incident happen between China and Japan in September 2010, an editorial
entitled “China shouldn't stir up anti-Japanese sentiments” was released by Yomiuri
Shimbun, similarly criticizing that China has instilled this belief [Diaoyu/Senkaku
Islands belong to China] among its people through "anti-Japanese patriotism"
education since the 1990s (Yomiuri Shimbun, 16 September 2010).
In Japanese academia, the same arguments over Chinese nationalism and
patriotic history education are getting more popular as well. Quite a number of
Japanese scholars, Akio Takahara in the University of Tokyo, for instance, believes
that China’s rising self-confidence in the nation, which reacts on the remaining sense
of inferiority and promotes nationalism of an aggressive nature, is a structural cause
of the tension between China and Japan (Takahara 2005:41). It is thus also argued by
some Japanese scholars that the history-based patriotic education in China has been
an important contributing factor for the Chinese peoples’ consistently negative
perceptions of Japan (Kobayashi 2008).
Although China and Japan fought a traumatic war from 1937 to 1945, they did

5

Numerous works have discussed the negative influence of Chinese nationalism on Sino-Japanese
relations. See, for example, Appenrodt (2008); Calder (2005); Callahan (2009); Chan and Bridges
(2006); Gong and Teo (2010); He (1998, 2007, 2009); Hughes (2006, 2008); Jiang (2006); Moore
(2010); Wang (2008); Zhao (2000).
3

not start to quarrel about history until the early 1980s, when the majority of the
populations in both countries no longer had a direct experience of the war and the
two countries had developed closer economic and social ties. By questioning why
this happened between China and Japan, Chinese scholar He Yinan (2007: 44)
believed that the fundamental cause of international political conflict over history lies
in the intentional manipulation of history by ruling elites, or national mythmaking,
for instrumental purposes; the national mythmaking in both China and Japan thus has
led to the mistrust between Chinese and Japanese and the failure of Sino-Japanese
reconciliation. On China’s side, He (2009) suggested that the “patriotic education
campaign”, which was promoted by the CCP leaders to sustain its legitimacy since
1989, has contributed to the volatile Sino-Japanese relations at both official and
popular levels.
However, is it true? Are the Chinese, especially Chinese youths, harboring such
strong anti-Japanese sentiments? Is a state-led “anti-Japanese patriotic education
campaign” really going on in China? Does Chinese patriotic education necessarily
lead to anti-Japanese sentiments among Chinese?
While more and more critics point to the Chinese “patriotic education
campaign” since 1989, blaming it as a trigger for anti-Japanese sentiments among
Chinese, particularly among Chinese youths, Japanese scholar Suzuki (2007:27)
refuted these critics, suggesting that although it is indeed true that the CCP has
promoted some form of patriotism to legitimize itself, it does not necessarily follow
that anti-Japanese sentiments per se are deliberately disseminated. He further pointed
out several crucial flaws such critics should confront: 1) a growth in popular
anti-Japanese sentiments may not secure the stability of CCP regime but instead
could result in the destructions of foreign property; 2) historical perceptions do
matter and thus it is unlikely for any Chinese leadership to be autonomous from
history memories; 3) Japanese imperialism can be used for regime legitimating only
when the rhetoric has “resonance” with the Chinese populace.
For many Chinese, as Chinese scholar Wang Zheng (2008:800-801) asserted,
the foreign invasions, the military defeats, the unequal treaties and all the details of
invaders’ atrocities during the “100 years of national humiliation” are not merely a
recounting of national history; Chinese people learn these sad stories not only from
history textbooks or patriotic education activities, but also from their parents and
4

grandparents. Although Wang (2008) believed that the institutionalized historical
discourses about the country’s traumatic national experiences have profoundly
influenced young people’s perceptions of the outside world, Wang also agreed with
Suzuki’s argument and believed that without comprehension of the primordial
background of Chinese nationalism, we would not be able to fully understand why
Chinese elite-led top-down propaganda campaign could have realized its objectives
of enhancing the regime’s political legitimacy and improving social solidarity.
By reviewing the existing literature on Chinese nationalism, Allen Carlson
(2009) has also criticized that in the absence of a broader set of comparisons and
empirical observations, the existing literature on Chinese nationalism has simply
assumed a surge of Chinese nationalism in the last two decades as a matter of fact
and understood Chinese nationalism in terms of exclusionary dichotomies. It is,
nonetheless, not necessary for Chinese nationalism to bear an exclusionary and
egoistic nature in the sense that the contemporary construction of national identity in
China is possible to proceed with transnational and global political space and
bottom-up narratives of national belongings at the grassroots level (Carlson 2009:
29-30). Contemporary Chinese nationalism, as Carlson (2009: 29) further suggested,
may differ from the Chinese nationalism in the old days as well as the nationalism in
other nations.
Given the fact that nationalism as a term is seldom used by either the Chinese
government or academia while patriotism is such a term overused by both Chinese
government and populace, there have also been debates on whether Chinese
nationalism is officially substituted for by patriotism.
In the PRC official discourse, the term “nationalism” is close to “chauvinism”,
which referred to parochial and reactionary attachments to nationalities, whereas
“patriotism” is just a love of the Chinese motherland (Zhao 1998: 290). Therefore,
for many Chinese, patriotism is a term totally different from nationalism. As CCP
General Secretary Jiang Zemin once emphasized in 1990 “the patriotism we advocate
is by no means a parochial nationalism.” (Jiang 1990). For many Chinese, patriotism,
instead, is essentially identical with socialism because “building socialism with
Chinese characteristics” has been officially justified as a common task for all
Chinese and is the main theme of patriotism in today’s China (Qiang and Fairbrother
2006:8). As the People’s Daily editorial stated on the 1996 National Day, “Patriotism
5

is specific… Patriotism requires us to love the socialist system and road chosen by
all nationalities in China under the leadership of the Communist Party.” (Quoted
from Zhao 1998: 291).
However, in the sense that China is such a nation-state with 56 ethnic groups
and “nationalism” as a term with ethnic connotations which may arouse nationalistic
fervor among multiple ethnic groups inside China, there has been another argument
suggesting that Chinese governments have purposely substituted nationalism with
patriotism in order to ensure Chinese national unity (Gries 2004; Kao 1996; Zheng
1999). To some extent, patriotism is indeed a more acceptable non-political notion to
the PRC government as it helps the people to focus on problems and challenges they
share in common. It acknowledges the ethnic differences among China’s population
but insists that all are members of a large nation that binds them together by the
Communist state. It thus helps the Communist Party, who speaks in a nation’s name,
to successfully demand the citizens to identify themselves with the nation and
subordinate other interests to those of the state. Characterized by its obvious
state-centric nature, Chinese patriotism, as was concluded by Zhao (1998), is in fact
state-led nationalism.
Due to its state-centric nature, however, some scholars contradictorily argue
against reducing Chinese patriotism to the western term nationalism. As Michael
Hunt (1994: 63) observed, “by professing aiguo (love the state), Chinese usually
expressed loyalty to and a desire to serve the state, either as it was or as it would be
in its renovated form.” This observation, as aforementioned, is shared by many
Chinese scholars, officials and populace who believe that Chinese patriotism is such
a term not equal with the concept of nationalism as understood in the western context
and bearing egoistic and exclusivist nature, but again, is just a love for the socialist
state. (Liu 2007; Jiang 2004; Pang 2005).
Efforts have also been undertaken by Chinese scholars to detach anti-Japanese
sentiments from Chinese patriotic education. By citing the recent popularity of
Japanese (and Korean) products and modern culture among Chinese youths, most
Chinese scholars of Chinese patriotism, instead, have criticized a growth of “national
nihilism” among Chinese youths nowadays and argued that the Chinese government
has never intended to instill anti-Japanese sentiments into its general public, but only
asks its people not to forget historical lessons so as to avoid the recurrence of
6

historical tragedies. They cited Chinese government’s official statements that people
of both countries should look forward into the future and be friends forever (Jiang
2005; Shang 2004). Following Mao Zedong’ s logic to distinguish the Japanese
people from a small batch of Japanese militarists, Chinese scholars also argued, if
there is anything Chinese history education teaches their students to go against, that
must be the Japanese imperialism and the war crimes committed by Japanese
militarists, but by no means the Japanese people (Pang 2005; Liu 2007).6
Public opinion polls conducted by the Institute of Japanese Studies of CASS
(Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) in 2004, 2006, and 2008 revealed that
Chinese respondents who chose incomplete reflections on wartime history by the
Japanese as one of their main reasons for having negative feelings of Japan were
much more in number than those who chose the history of Japan’s invasion in
modern China as a reason.7 Based on these survey results, recent attempts have also
been made to distinguish the history of Japan’s invasion in modern China from
Japanese current attitudes toward history. In doing so, Chinese governments and
scholars suggest that what Chinese mostly care about is current Japanese attitudes
toward history but not the past history itself, and letting people know about the
history itself is by all means necessary and beneficial for the bilateral relations.8

1.2

Research Question
Discussions of Chinese nationalism and why Chinese harbor consistently

negative feelings of Japan are ongoing.9 One key aspect of these discussions would
be Chinese patriotic education and its impacts on Chinese youths’ perceptions of
Japan. By assuming the high effectiveness of Chinese patriotic education and looking
at Chinese perceptions of Japan in a dichotomous way, a seemingly popular
argument sets out that there exist strong anti-Japanese sentiments among Chinese
populace, especially among Chinese youths, and that Chinese patriotic education
necessarily leads to Chinese youths’ anti-Japanese sentiments. Actually, this has

6

Two textbook designers and two historians I interviewed during my fieldtrip to Beijing and Nanjing
also indicated similar ideas. See Chapter III.
7
For specific figures, see the Institute of Japanese Studies of CASS (2004, 2006, 2009).
8
These arguments can be found in Liu (2002); Jiang (2005); and Su (2000).
9
There have also been more empirical examinations on Chinese history and patriotic education in
recent years. See, for example, Fairbrother (2006); Friedman (2008); Jin and Li (2011); Müller et al.
(2011); Rose (2010); Shin and Sneider et al. (2011).
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simplified Chinese patriotic education, Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan as well
as the mechanism of how Chinese patriotic education impacts on Chinese youths’
perceptions of Japan in this way:

The “Patriotic Education
Campaign" since 1989
Textbooks
History education
in schools

Teachers

Students’
understanding
of Japan and
Sino-Japanese
relations

Chinese
youths’
anti-Japanese
sentiments

Extra-curricular activities

However, does this very assumption of the “creator-receiver connection” really
work out in China? If whether Chinese patriotic education per se has impacts on
Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan is not a proper research question to ask since
the role of school as a political socialization agent has been widely admitted and
confirmed, the questions of to what extent Chinese patriotic education affects
Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan and what these effects are should definitely be
proper, and actually important, questions to ask. Thus, this study raises a main
research question of “what effects of Chinese patriotic education has on Chinese
youths’ perceptions of Japan?”
To address this main research question and to question the very assumptions of
the “creator-receiver connections”, this study accordingly asks sub-questions about
the “creator”, Chinese patriotic education, in chapter III: 1) What is Chinese patriotic
education really about? 2) How does Chinese patriotic education actually work out in
China? 3) What information about Japan does Chinese patriotic education intend to
teach Chinese youths? In Chapter IV, this study further asks about the reactions of
the “receivers” — Chinese youths: 4) How do Chinese youths actually perceive
Japan? 5) How do Chinese youths receive and “digest” the information about Japan
from the school patriotic curriculum?
Through answering all these sub-questions respectively addressing the “creator”
and “receivers,” this study again comes back to its main research question and tries
to come out with a more genuine picture of how Chinese patriotic education affects
8

Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan.

1.3 Study Scope
In response to the aforementioned discussions on “Chinese patriotic education
campaign” after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989 and its impacts on Chinese youths’
perceptions of Japan, this study principally focuses on the post-1989 patriotic
education in China. For comparative study, however, it also traces China’s
ideological-political education back to 1978 when China inaugurated its reform and
opening-up policy and started an emphasis on patriotic education. Patriotic education,
as parts of the party-state’s political-ideological education program is indeed broader
than other forms of schooling and may be hidden in every corner of the society.
However, in the sense that patriotic education in schools is the most direct reflection
of state’s political-ideological education and the secondary schooling is taken as the
core of patriotic education in schools according to the Outline for Implementing
Patriotic Education,10 this study thus narrows its research subjects down to patriotic
education and Chinese youths in secondary schools, including both junior and senior
levels. Within schools, the patriotic education curriculum is also infused in both
classes and extra-curricular activities to different extents. Regarding the education
containing information about Japan, as is found from my analysis on China’s
post-1989 patriotic education and my survey with secondary school students, history
classes in schools are the classes where most information about Japan are supposed
to be taught due to Japan’s dominant role in wartime history, 11 and thus is
particularly emphasized in the “patriotic education campaign” after 1989. Simply put,
this study focuses on the patriotic history curriculum in secondary schools.
According to the Outline for Implementing Patriotic Education again, Chinese
youths, most of whom are under schooling and particularly those in secondary
schools, are the focus of Chinese patriotic education. 12 To examine the direct
impacts of the patriotic education in secondary schools and address a group of
Chinese youths who have seldom been addressed in previous studies, this study thus

10

See the “Outline for Implementing Patriotic Education,” the Selected Archives of Importance since
the 14th People’s Congress Meeting, p. 925.
11
See survey results of Q9 in Appendix II.
12
See the “Outline for Implementing Patriotic Education,” p. 925.
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focuses on Chinese students in secondary schools and particularly examines their
reactions to the patriotic history curriculum as well as their perceptions of Japan.13

1.4 Theoretical Framework
Schools, as one of the most controllable agents for political socialization, have
also been widely taken as one of most effective socialization agents in influencing
students’ political attitudes by conveying knowledge and prescribing attitudes
through the curriculum and textbooks, through the influence of teachers, and through
children’s participation in extracurricular and ritual activities (Dawson, et al. 1977).
Empirically, however, scholars in political socialization theory had come to doubt the
effectiveness of school education as an agent for regimes to justify their rule and
motivate populations behind national goals.
Based on their empirical research, Kenneth Langton and Kent Jennings (1968)
have shown the weak correlations between American high school civic education
courses and a number of political attitudes. Reviews of other empirical studies have
also cast doubt upon the effects of the curriculum, teachers, extracurricular activities,
and the general secondary school experience on students’ political orientations, views,
values, attitudes, and behavior.

14

Some explanations for the ineffectiveness of schooling in influencing students’
political attitudes lay blame on the contradictory or stronger effects from other
socialization agents, such as the mass media, family education, peer groups, personal
experience, etc., while others focus on the structures and actors (teachers and
students in particular) within schooling itself

(Beck 1977; Langton and Jennings

1969).
The explanation of redundancy, for example, asserts that by the time students
reach secondary school, the political messages of the school are duplicating those
which students have already encountered in earlier stages of schooling or outside the
schools (Langton and Jennings 1969). Political messages from secondary schools

13

Previous studies have focused more on Chinese college students for their perceptions of Japan. See
(Chen (2003); Li and Shi (2005); Sha (2008) and the Public Opinion Polls jointly conducted by China
Daily and Genron NPO in Japan since 2005. Caroline Rose has recently had an empirical examination
on Chinese and Japanese civil education in primary schools. See Rose (2010).
14
For a summary of these studies, see Fairbrother (2002:22).
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thus may be just a repetition of those in previous years or echoes of what students
have heard or are hearing from other sources, which may result in a diminished
impact between new and old information and consensus among messages students
receive from schools and other agents of socialization. Students may thus miss or
ignore what is intended to be taught to them (Dawson, et al. 1977 ).
Another school-level explanation focuses on the roles of teachers as mediators
between intended and implemented curriculum. Due to the conflicting demands and
pressures from administrators, other teachers, parents and students as well as
problems of education system, such as, examination and curriculum reforms,
teachers may have to cope with both these conflicting demands and over workload
through the tactics of “routinizing procedures, modifying goals, rationing services
and asserting priorities” or a cost-benefit type analysis (Weatherley and Lipsky 1977;
Clark and Lampert 1986). Therefore, the implemented curriculum may substantially
differ from the intended one after teachers have specified “how much time will be
devoted to a subject, what topics will be taught, and how well topics are to be
learned” (Schwille, et al. 1983, quoted from Fairbrother 2002: 24). With different
personal experience and educational backgrounds, teachers may also have different
understandings and interpretations of the intended curriculum. Students thus may
find conflicts among the interpretations of different teachers on one particular issue
and compromise their receptions of the messages taught by the teachers (Goodlad
1986). In this way, to what extent the intended curriculum is actually implemented
and received by students largely depends on teachers who act as the mediators
between the intended and implemented curriculum.
The final explanation focuses on students, who are the “receivers” of the
schooling and have the final saying of the effectiveness of school education.
According to Wendy Griswold (1994: 14), cultural objects such as textbooks need
audiences or receivers who digest the former, and unless cultural objects have
“people who receive them, people who hear, read, understand, think about, enact,
participate in, remember them,” their intended messages and cultural meanings
cannot be enacted. In other words, only when students receive and “digest” the
information from school curricula, can school curricula have impacts on students.
Thus, examination on students’ reactions to the schooling is no doubt necessary for
studying the effects of the schooling.
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There are various factors, however, affecting students’ reception or “digestion”
of the message from schools, making examination of students’ reactions to the
schooling hard and complicated. Students, especially those in their young age, for
example, may have problems in understanding and grasping political messages due
to their intrinsic failure to understand certain complex and abstract political concepts
(Hess and Torney 1967). Also, students’ interests in the content, their relationships
with teachers, their exposure to the other information resources and their
personalities as well as personal experiences may all contribute to their reception and
“digestion” of the messages from schools (Dawson, et al., 1977).
As suggested by Fairbrother based on his comparative and empirical study on
the patriotic education and students’ national identity in Mainland China and Hong
Kong, students’ critical thinking (or in Henry Giroux’s word, “resistance”) of the
political message from schools may tell better stories of Chinese students’ reaction to
their political schooling and explain why political socialization messages may not
come to be fully accepted and taken in by students in China.
According to Giroux’s “resistance” theory (1983a), schools as one of the
controllable institutions for political socialization, represent the interests of the
dominant group in society. This may cause students’ perceptions of “hegemony” or
the unequal relations between the dominants and the subordinates. In the situation
when students find incongruity between the political messages they are being taught
in schools and alternative messages from other groups or actors in society, the
perception of “hegemony” may lead students to resist the political messages from
schools (Fairbrother 2002: 30).
A reaction of “resistance”, as Giroux (1983a: 291) noted, should involve
“critical thinking and reflective action.” Critical thinking, as defined by Catherine D.
Ennis (1996), is “reasonable reflective thinking focused on deciding what to believe
or do” (p.10, quoted from Fairbrother (2002: 34)). It engages in “a certain skepticism,
or suspension of assent, towards a given statement, established norm or mode of
doing things… it considers alternative hypotheses and possibilities” (McPeck 1981:
6).
With critical thinking, as Fairbrother’s empirical research found out, Mainland
students in China exhibited their skepticism toward the hegemonic political
socialization in schools although they did not completely deny the influence of the
12

schooling and took advantage of those aspects of the schooling experience which
could be viewed as less like indoctrination, extracurricular activities and
encouragement to form their own attitudes toward the nation, as well as the relatively
free intellectual atmosphere of the university (Fairbrother 2002: 198). Students’
individual perceptions and other socialization factors, as further shown by
Fairbrother’s survey data, partially detracted from Mainland students’ patriotism and
nationalism through fostering and interacting with their critical thinking (Fairbrother
2002: 258).
Regarding the effects of Chinese patriotic education on Chinese youths’
perceptions of Japan, can Chinese patriotic curricula in schools succeed in cultivating
Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan by telling the historical stories about
Sino-Japanese wars and Japan’s invasion in modern China when Chinese youths
nowadays have grown up with numerous Japanese products and Japanese
contemporary cultures rather than with direct experience of Sino-Japanese wars?
With many more economic and social exchanges between China and Japan and in a
relatively more liberal Chinese society with both globalization and new
communication structures today, to what extent does the information about Japan
from the school curricula contribute to students’ understanding of Japan and
Sino-Japanese relations? Also, with pressures from all kinds of examinations in the
Chinese educational system and students’ pragmatic approaches to deal with the
coursework in schools, how well, then, do students “digest” the school curricula, and
particularly the message about Japan from schools?
These questions are definitely necessary and important to be answered if one
would like to judge the effects of Chinese patriotic education on Chinese youths’
perceptions of Japan. Without further inquiry on these questions, one can hardly
make assumptions on the effects of Chinese patriotic education or even blame it as a
trigger for Chinese youths’ anti-Japanese sentiments.

1.5 Research Methods
While being aware of numerous existing theoretical arguments on Chinese
nationalism/patriotism (education) and its history narratives (and production), this
study, instead, intends to have an empirical survey on the topic. Also, being aware
that previous researches have seldom addressed the reactions of “receivers” –
13

Chinese students – to the history narratives of the “creator” – patriotic education in
schools,15 this study attempts to examine the characteristics of the Chinsee patriotic
curriculum and empirically survey Chinese students’ reception and “digestions” of
the patriotic curricula in schools. This empirical study, therefore, consists of two
parts: analysis on Chinese patriotic history curriculum and survey on students’
reactions to the curriculum.
The whole process of the empirical examinations generally involves two stages:
data collection and data analyses. While site visits, in-depth interviews and
questionnaire surveys are carried out to collect data, both qualitative and quantitative
analysis are adopted for data analyses.

1.5.1 Data collection
I.

Field Research and In-depth Interviews
The process of data collection began with a fieldtrip to Beijing and Nanjing

where famous patriotic education bases concerning Japan’s invasion in modern
China,16 and the biggest state-owned press for publishing textbooks—the People’s
Education Press—are located.
During the fieldtrip, site visits to several important patriotic education bases
were conducted, with notes and photos taken of the museum exhibitions as well as
visitors’ comments.17 Visits were also paid to the library of the People’s Education

15

There have been both theoretical and empirical researches on Chinese patriotic education and its
impacts on students. However, few of them have empirically examined students’ reactions to the
patriotic education. As Kazuya Fukuoka (2011) suggested, emphasizing creators of history narratives
(and their production), the field tends to overlook the audience, or, receivers in the process.
Fairbrother (2002)’s empirical work on secondary school and college student’s reactions to the civic
education in Hong Kong and patriotic education in Mainland education is one of the few. By
examining the textbooks of the civic classes at the primary level in both China and Japan, Caroline
Rose (2010) also made a contribution to the existing empirical works in the field, but she also pointed
out the importance to analyze students’ “digestion” of the curriculum in the end of her paper.
16
The “Outline for Implementing the Patriotic Education” (1994) required local governments of all
levels to use different sorts of museums, memorial halls, buildings in memory of martyrs, sites of
important battles in revolutionary wars, protected historic relics, and scenic sites for conducting
patriotic education. In March 1995, the Ministry of Civil Affairs announced that 100 sites were selected
as the national level “patriotic education bases.” For more details about the 100 patriotic education
bases, see Wang (2008).
17
The patriotic education bases visited include the Museum of the War of Chinese People` s
Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, the Memorial Sculpture Garden of the War of Chinese
People` s Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, and the Marco Polo Bridge in Beijing as well as
the Memorial Hall of The Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders in Nanjing. Visitors’
comments are voluntarily and freely left by the visitors when they are having and finish their visits to
the museums. These comments could be visitors’ feelings towards the themes of the museums and
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Press in order to examine different editions of history textbooks in secondary schools
and have in-depth interviews with two history textbooks designers. To inquire about
the nature of Chinese nationalism/patriotism and the impacts of Chinese history
education on Sino-Japanese relations, in-depth interviews were also administered
with another 2 historians in Chinese modern and contemporary history and 6
specialists in both Chinese patriotic education and Sino-Japanese relations.18
For those in-depth interviews with textbook designers, historians and specialists,
the construction of a semi-structured interview schedule was designed beforehand,
guided by the existing literature on Chinese history education, Chinese
nationalism/patriotism and their impacts on Sino-Japanese relations. Due to the
expertise of different interviewees, different questions related to different aspects
were asked. Those questions, however, all pointed to the research topic and can be
initially grouped into the following aspects: 1) the nature of Chinese
nationalism/patriotism; 2) the design of history and patriotic curriculum in secondary
schools and its impacts on students’ views of foreign countries; 3) Chinese
(especially Chinese youths) perceptions of Japan and the impacts of Chinese
nationalism on Sino-Japanese relations.
Exploratory interviews were also conducted with history teachers and students
from secondary schools in Shenzhen and Nanjing.19 In these interviews with history
teachers, I talked to them individually either online or in face-to-face manner.20 With
a semi-structured schedule in hand, my talk with the history teachers in general
focused on the following two questions: 1) what and how do they actually teach
students about Japan in and out of history classes with the patriotic education
curriculum？2) how do they evaluate the impacts of the patriotic history curriculum
on students and students images of Japan?

their advice for the improvements of the museums.
18
Those historians and specialists interviewed currently teach and work in the top universities and
research institute in Beijing and Nanjing. Interviews were taped with the consent of the interviewees,
with anonymity assured.
19
Since Shenzhen is a new city without historical events concerning Japan’s invasions in modern
China while Nanjing did experience dominant ones, it is reasonable to assume it is more likely for
these two cities to have different approaches to history and patriotic education, particularly regarding
to Japan. Thus, 4 teachers and 10 students in total were conveniently selected from two secondary
schools in Shenzhen and Nanjing.
20
Interviews with the teachers from Shenzhen were conducted in face-to-face manner while
interviews with the teachers from Nanjing were conducted online.
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To see students’ reflections on the patriotic history curriculum in schools and as
parts of the pretests for the questionnaire survey in the later stage, students were
interviewed with a structured schedule (See Appendix I), in which open-ended
questions were carefully designed and students were asked to answer the open-ended
questions one by one without time constraint.21 The structured interview schedule
mainly covered the following three aspects: 1) what do students know about Japan? 2)
through what means do students receive information about Japan? and 3) how do
students view Japan as well as the patriotic history education in their schools?
With both semi-structured and structured interviews, specific information and
tentative insights into how Chinese patriotic history education is implemented in
schools and how students “digest” the education were provided by the history
teachers and students interviewed. However, given the small number of teachers and
students who could feasibly be interviewed, it would be difficult to gauge differences
and similarities in the ways teachers teach students about Japan in schools and
students’ reflections to the education. It is also acknowledged that the interviews
(especially those with historians, specialists and textbook designers) would suffer
from the following limitations. First, it would be difficult (and understandable) for all
the interviewees, who are Chinese, to be truly value-free and interpret Chinese
patriotism objectively, even though they are all well-educated and are experts in their
fields. Second, due to the political sensitivity of the topic, there may still be a certain
political “propaganda” element in the response (especially those of interviewees who
actually participate in designing the patriotic education curriculum).

II. Questionnaire Survey
To address the limitations of in-depth interviews and to have a more faithful and
genuine picture of Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan, a detailed questionnaire
survey was administered to 643 secondary schools students in 8 mainland cities
where large-scale anti-Japanese protests have taken place both in1996 and 2005.22

21

All the students from both Nanjing and Shenzhen were interviewed with the same structured
schedule. While interviews with students from Shenzhen were conducted in oral and face-to-face
manner, interviews with students from Nanjing were also conducted online through email..
22
The survey was carried out in 9 mainland cities – Shenyang, Xi’an, Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing,
Wuhan, Changsha, Chongqing and Shenzhen – at the very beginning. As the sample of Xi’an was
withdrawn from the total sample due to a possible invalid and unreliable dataset from a preliminary
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With extensive reference to the published public opinion polls administered
nationwide in mainland China by both Chinese and Japanese organizations, most of
the questions and items in the questionnaire were firstly drawn from the previously
published polls.23 To make the questionnaire best fit within the context of our
research objects, however, certain questions and scale items were revised based on
the information gathered from the earlier exploratory interviews with textbook
designers, scholars and teachers as well as students.
To further enhance the construct validity of the questionnaires, efforts were also
tried to obtain the evaluations of the accuracy, consistency and comprehensiveness of
the questionnaire from 4 professors, each of whom is both interested in the research
topic and has expertise in Chinese patriotic education, Sino-Japanese relations,
political socialization or survey research. Moreover, advice from teachers and
students in secondary schools was sought to further develop the questionnaire so that
the questionnaire could have better measurements and be fully understood by the
respondents -- secondary school students.
In terms of the content, the questionnaire generally addresses the following
concerns: 1) what and through what means do students know about Japan? 2) what
do students learn about Japan through the history and patriotic education curricula in
schools? 3) how do students view Japan and “digest” the history and patriotic
curricula in schools? 4) what impacts do the history and patriotic curricula in schools
have on students’ perceptions of Japan?
The questionnaire was originally written in Chinese and later translated into
English with the help and evaluation of an English native speaker, a Hong Kong
Chinese, a mainland Chinese as well as a Singaporean who speaks very good
Mandarin. For both English and Chinese versions of the questionnaire, see Appendix
II and III.
Given pilot tests administered in small-scale samples from Shenzhen, Wuhan
and Nanjing in earlier stages, 24 the final version of the questionnaire with 18

analysis, the survey data of the other 8 cities was analyzed.
23
These public opinion polls include 4 polls conducted by the Japanese Studies Institute of CASS in
every two years since 2002, and annual surveys jointly conducted by China Daily and Genron NPO in
Japan since 2005.
24
Before pilot tests, pre-tests were repeatedly administered with secondary schools students in
Shenzhen for better construction and distribution of the questionnaire. To group representativeness,
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closed-ended questions was refined and distributed to students of different grades
and classes by their teachers in different cities during June 1st -10th , 2011.25
Students were sampled from one or two public secondary schools conveniently
accessed in each city,26 ranging from the first year students in junior high schools to
the third year students in senior high schools. Fifteen students were selected from
each of the six grades, making a sub-sample of 90 for each city and a total sample of
720 for 8 cities. With a response rate of 89.3%,27 643 valid cases with complete
responses were collected. Of these valid cases, 65 are cases from Beijing, 73 from
Chongqing, 79 from Changsha, 87 from Nanjing, 88 from Shanghai, 90 from
Shenyang, 89 from Shenzhen, and 72 from Wuhan.

1.5.2 Data analyses
I.

Qualitative Analysis
Through the previous fieldwork, textbooks material, teaching guidelines,

official documents, transcripts of interviews as well as museums visitors’ comments
were collected. Qualitative approaches, such as content analysis and the methods of
summary and induction then were used to analyze these archival data at hand.
For textbook materials, teaching guidelines, official documents and museum
visitors’ comments, content analyses were mainly conducted. At first, relevant textual
data of these materials were selected, condensed and classified into different groups.

pilot tests were finally administered to 60 students from Shenzhen, Wuhan and Nanjing, each of which
had 20 students conveniently sampled.
25
Students ranging from the first year in junior high schools to the second year of senior high schools
were asked to complete the questionnaires within 15 minutes in classes and directly returned the
questionnaires to the teachers. However, since the third year students in senior high schools are taking or
have taken the College Entrance Examinations when the survey was conducted, and could not be
regularly accessed in the classes, the questionnaires had to be distributed to them individually through
mailings and be returned with return envelopes.
26
In Mainland China, there are different types of secondary schools. According to the figures from the
Ministry of Education, however, nearly 90% of the secondary schools are public schools in 2010.
Though all secondary schools in China are more or less required to follow a patriotic education
curriculum, public secondary schools are generally believed to provide the strongest patriotic education.
Thus, to examine the impacts of official patriotic education, we had our samples taken from public
schools rather than from other types of schools. Among the 8 cities under observation, students in
Beijing, Wuhan and Chongqing were from two different public secondary schools since schools
selected were either junior high schools or senior high schools, while students from Shenyang, Shanghai,
Nanjing, Changsha and Shenzhen came from the same secondary schools with both junior and senior
high classes. Following the principle of anonymity, the names of these schools are not revealed here.
27
The response rate was obtained with the exclusion of the Xi’an’s sample. Of 720 questionnaires
distributed in the examined cities, 48 were not returned, and 29 were discounted for their partial
completion.
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Subject to our research questions, these textual data were then coded and in turn used
together with statistical data in an attempt to understand salient themes and test
relevant suggested assumptions.
For transcripts of the interviews, however, data were analyzed inductively.
Detailed transcripts of interviews were firstly summarized. They were then
categorized into the three aspects which the interviews were intended to address. In
this way, instead of detailed transcript being cited, opinions from different interviews
were summed up with corresponding themes and used to answer the questions
addressed in Chapter III and IV.

II. Quantitative Analysis
Closed-ended questionnaire survey makes it possible to carry out quantitative
statistical analyses with the data. It also makes it possible to compare research
subjects by different variables and examine relationships between variables. For the
research purpose of this study, descriptive analyses and the statistical procedures of
comparing means, such as independent samples t-tests and ANOVA, through SPSS
computer software, were mainly used. Moreover, to examine relationships between
certain variables, correlation analysis (Pearson’s correlation) was also employed.

1.6 Structure of the Thesis
With this introductory chapter covering literature reviews, research questions,
study scope, theoretical framework and research methods of the study, the next
chapter provides a brief historical review of Chinese perceptions of Japan since 1972
as background information for further discussions. Based on both qualitative and
quantitative analysis on the empirical data collected from the fieldworks and surveys,
the study then comes to address the research questions on Chinese patriotic education
after 1989 in chapter III and further discusses Chinese youths’ reactions to the
patriotic curriculum in schools and their perceptions of Japan in chapter IV. In
chapter V, this study comes back to answer the main research question and generally
concludes the effects of patriotic education on Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan.
To link the findings of this study with its social background, a further discussion on
Chinese “confident nationalism” in current Chinese society is also provided in the
conclusion, placing the study under the broader discussions on the evolving Chinese
19

nationalism and its impacts. In the end are elaborations of the contributions and
limitations of the study as well as several practical suggestions for improving mutual
perceptions and the bilateral relations between China and Japan.
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Chapter 2
Chinese Perceptions of Japan since 1972

2.1 Introduction
Being close neighbors in Asia, China and Japan had enjoyed good relations for a
long time in ancient times. The long friendships were unfortunately interrupted by
the brutal warfare between two countries in modern times, leaving much historical
legacy to the bilateral relations in the postwar and current days. After the World War
II, due to the Cold War structural constraints and Japan’s official recognition of
Taiwan as the legitimate Chinese government during the 1950s and 1960s, the
normalization of Sino-Japanese relations did not come until the 1970s when China
split with the Soviet Union and the U.S. subsequently sought Sino-American
rapprochement for Chinese assistance to end the Vietnam War and to facilitate the
broader goal of balancing Soviet power. To inquire into the impacts of Chinese
patriotic education on Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan since 1989, however, this
study mainly focuses on the Sino-Japanese relations after the normalization in 1972.
For further discussions in the later chapters, this chapter attempts to have a general
review of the bilateral relations since 1972 and particularly outline a picture of the
evolving Chinese perceptions of Japan in the past 40 years.
2.2 The “honeymoon” period: mutual perceptions improved in 1970s
Faced with the common Soviet threat in the later stages of the Cold War, soon
after the “Nixon Shock”,28 Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka paid an official
visit to Beijing to seal the Sino-Japanese normalization with his Chinese counterparts
on 25 September 1972. While China aimed at strengthening its anti-Soviet front
through the Sino-Japanese rapprochement, Japan attempted to gain a certain
diplomatic autonomy by normalizing relations with Beijing before the Sino-U.S.
rapprochements (Chalmers 1986: 403; He 2009: 186). Motivated by these pragmatic

28

In February 1972, the U.S. President Richard Nixon surprisingly paid a visit to China and signed
the Shanghai Communiqué with China. This unexpected gesture caused shock outside China and the
U.S., including for the Japanese government and people (Feng, Gao and Wang 2007: 310-311).
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objectives, China and Japan thus joined efforts to build up a mutually beneficial
relationship between two nations in 1970s, directly and indirectly promoting friendly
relations between two peoples as well.
In a 1969 survey in Japan, China was rated as the second largest security threat
to Japan (15.6%) after the USSR (20.4%). 29 A survey in April 1972, however,
showed that the percentage of Japanese people who saw China as the most
threatening country dropped to 9%, which fell far behind those who felt the same
way about the USSR (34.3%) and even the U.S. (16.6%).30 On China’s side, without
public opinion polls about Sino-Japanese relations being conducted in 1970s, it was
nonetheless known that China’s previous travel restrictions with Japan were scrapped
and personnel exchanges between two sides increased rapidly soon after the
Sino-Japanese normalization. Regular exchanges of commercial flights between
Tokyo and Beijing began in September 1974 and by November 1981, friendly
exchange relations had been established between 33 pairs of “sister cities”.31
With these good postures between two governments and the goodwill of senior
officials in both sides to develop friendships between two countries, the mutual
perceptions of Chinese and Japanese people were obviously improved after the
normalization, even though most of the Chinese who had suffered from the wars still
kept in mind the traumatic past while most of Japanese took China as a backward
country in need of Japan’s help. In China, for instance, following the establishment
of diplomatic relations with Japan, positive images of contemporary Japan, though
co-existing with negative media treatment of past Sino-Japanese conflicts, portrayed
Japan as a role model that should be emulated in selective ways (Whiting 1989: 80).
Favorable depictions of all walks of the life in Japan, which covered education,
technology, economic and even Japanese daily life, were found in both Chinese
scholarly works and official newspaper, such as Zhongguo Qingnian (Chinese Youth
Daily) and Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily). These descriptions of Japanese
29

Yomiuri Shimbun survey on public perceptions of the U.S.-Japan alliance, June 1969, in Public
Relations Office, Cabinet Secretariat of Japanese Prime Minster, Seron Chosa Nenkan, 1970, 492,
quoted from He (2009: 201)
30
National survey on Japanese attitudes toward the U.S. and China and approval rates of cabinet and
political parties by the Japan Association for Public Opinion, April 1972, in Ibid, 1973, 395, quoted
from He (2009: 201)
31
The China-Japan Friendship Association, “Table on Friendly Cities between China and Japan
(Chronologically)”, see http://www.zryx.org.cn/AssociateCityList.aspx?toSort=0, accessed on April
25, 2012.
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contemporary society and its postwar evolution, while facilitating the leaderships’
efforts to promote good relations between two countries, countered the war memories
in Chinese minds and gradually built up Chinese new images of Japan and Japanese
contemporary society in this “honeymoon period” in 1970s.

2.3 Tensions come back: wartime memories stirred up in 1980s.
The amicable atmosphere between China and Japan during 1970s did not
continue into the 1980s even though China and Japan still shared a common strategic
interest to balance the Soviet threat in this period. Washington’s continued military
commitment to Taiwan in late 1970s, which was displayed through arms sales to
Taiwan and the Taiwan Relations Act (enacted in April 1979), also distanced Beijing
from Washington. Beijing formally endorsed its so-called independent foreign policy
at the Twelfth Party Congress in September 1982 and shortly afterward resumed
normalization talks with Moscow (He 2009:207). Japan, by the beginning of the
1980s, had become an economic giant. It then sought to promote international
political influence to commensurate with its economic power. As both the
international and domestic environments changed, tensions between China and Japan
came back and demolished the friendly relationships which were built up in the
1970s.
Under the three principles (Peaceful and Friendly, Equal and Mutually
Beneficial, Long-term and Stable) for the bilateral relations proposed by Premier
Zhao Ziyang in June 1982 when he visited Japan,32 and with Japan’s extension of
generous yen loans to China, Sino-Japanese diplomacy still remained an upbeat tone
at the beginning of the 1980s (He 2009: 232). However, starting with the disputes
over Japanese history textbooks in 1982, Sino-Japanese relationship turned to a
downturn due to frequent inter-governmental disputes and the simmering mutual
antipathy at the popular level from the mid-1980s.
The textbook disputes in 1982 had caused such a lengthy and bitter coverage of
the campaign in the mass media from both sides, stirring up China’s memories of the
wartime past and aroused contemporary Chinese youths over possible Japanese

32

This was developed into “four principles” by adding “mutually trust” in November 1983 when Hu
Yaobang visited Japan. See: http://www.people.com.cn/GB/guoji/8212/30794/30796/2230761.html,
accessed in April 25, 2012.
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militarist behavior in the future (Whiting 1989: 28). The commemoration of the
fortieth anniversary of Japan’s surrender in 1985 also brought vividly communicated
accounts of wartime suffering to the younger generation in China. Dramatic evidence
of the impacts of these issues came in September in 1985 when thousands of
university students in Beijing and elsewhere publicly demonstrated against Japanese
Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine, which honored the
memory of Japanese war dead including 14 class-A war criminals, on the anniversary
day of the 1931 Manchurian Incident (Whiting 1989: 28).
The theme of wartime recall reemerged in 1986 during the second textbook
dispute. Although this dispute ended without the rancor of the first dispute and
without too much attention from media, public objections still remained on the
Chinese side (Whiting 1989: 20-21). Despite little media attention, many Chinese
individuals showed a keen knowledge of the details and expressed considerable
emotion in criticizing the Japanese handling of the matter. Although the 1986
controversy was diplomatically settled down with the compromise from both sides,
this repeated dispute further educated Chinese, especially the Chinese younger
generations who have not personal experiences of the wars, about the past wartime
history and worsened their images of Japan.
Almost at the same time of the history textbook disputes, in both 1986 and 1987,
the Osaka High Court twice recognized Taiwan’s ownership of a student dormitory in
Kyoto called the Guanghua Hostel (Kokaryo in Japanese), which was purchased by
the KMT regime in Taiwan in 1952. This dormitory dispute unavoidably increased
attention over Taiwan from both the Chinese government and its people. It not only
reminded Chinese people of the history that Taiwan was taken by Japan in 1895, but
also further triggered Chinese worry over Japanese reviving militarism. It thus again
resulted in another clash of Chinese and Japanese nationalism as well as another
bitter war of words between Beijing and Tokyo regarding the legitimacy of the
Taiwan regime (Howe, ed 1996: 74-76).
Coming to the late 1980s, as an accumulative result of the previous disputes,
Chinese government turned to criticize the strengthening of Japan’s military
capabilities, questioning Japanese government’s decision to break the 1 percent GNP
ceiling for annual defense spending in 1987 and directly remarking its worry over the
revival of Japanese militarism. Due to the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, Japan joined
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the other Group of Seven (G-7) industrialized nations in isolating China in both
political and economic ways. China and Japan thus suspended the bilateral summits
by the end of the 1980s and the friendly relations soon cooled off (Whiting and Xin
1990: 108).
The bilateral disputes and frictions in the 1980s may have soon died down, but
they eventually led to public frustration between two sides in this period. The
anti-Japanese student protests across China began with the historical disputes in this
period. As a reaction, Japanese people started feeling “annoyed” and resentful with
the Chinese “playing the history card.” Under an “action-reaction syndrome”, as
argued by Allen Whiting (1989: 196), popular nationalism and estrangement turned
stronger between the two countries during this period and continued rising since
then.
2.4 “Economically hot, politically cold”: popular relations frozen in mid-1990s
and early 2000s.
Although downgraded from the previous rapprochement to frictions within the
stage of shallow reconciliation in 1980s, the general atmosphere of Sino-Japanese
relations did not turn decisively negative (He 2009: 232). The China-Japan joint polls
held in 1988 showed that 50.6% of Chinese respondents and 64.4% percent of
Japanese respondents still thought the current bilateral relationship was “very good”
or “good” (Jiang 1989: 23). As a matter of fact, as suggested by Whiting
(1989:80-92), Chinese perceptions of Japan were dual images of an “economic role
model” and a “ruthless aggressor” in the 1980s. The Sino-Japanese relationships
therefore did not see actually downward spiral until the mid-1990s.
Coming to the 1990s, the common basis of the strategic interests for China and
Japan in defending themselves from the “Soviet Threat” disappeared with the end of
the Cold War in the early 1990s. The U.S. then began to adjust its China policy from
“alliance” to one of seeing a major ideological enemy and a potential geo-political
rival in the West Pacific zone (Jin 2001: 104). Faced with these international changes
in post-Cold-War era, China and Japan had to re-define their bilateral relationship
(Manicom and O'Neil 2009: 217). Sino-Japanese relations thus met uncertainty and
volatilities during this post-Cold-War era.
Although Japan joined the G-7 in isolating China after the Tiananmen Incident
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in 1989, Japan soon restarted its ODA to China in July 1990, being the first country
of the G-7 to stop isolating China. With the frequent inter-governmental visits
between two countries in the next two years, including Japanese Prime Minister
Toshiki Kaifu’s official visit to China in 1991, the General Secretary of CCP Jiang
Zemin’s visit to Japan in 1992 and the well-received visit to China by the Japanese
Emperor and Empress in 1992, Sino-Japanese relations enjoyed temporary serenity
in the early 1990s.
However, Sino-Japanese relations started the downturn of both governmental
and popular relations from the mid-1990s (He 2009: 234). The downturn of the
bilateral relations was precipitated by the controversy over whether a Taiwan official,
Hsu Li-teh, should be allowed to attend the opening ceremony of the Asian Games in
Hiroshima in 1994 and the exchanges over Chinese nuclear testing in 1995.
Following disagreements were over Japanese right-wingers’ repeated attempts to
land on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in 1996 and Japanese PM Ryutaro Hashimoto’s
visit to Yasukuni Shrine in the same year. Bilateral frictions even continued during
Chinese president Jiang Zemin’s formal visit to Tokyo in November 1998, in which
he harshly criticized Japan’s wartime history and demanded Japanese contrition. All
these frictions in the mid-1990s consequently led Sino-Japanese relations to the
worst point since 1972 (Jin 2001: 106).
In February 1997 when Zhongguo qingnianbao reported on its 1996 survey of
100 000 Chinese young people, it asserted that just 15% of them had good feelings
toward Japan and 14% thought Sino-Japanese relations were good. A 1997 follow-up,
however, found that only 10% like Japan and 34% dislike it (quoted from Rozman
(2002), Amako 1998: 24).
Alarmed by the downturn in public opinion, leaders in both sides had tried some
efforts to stabilize the bilateral relations. Jiang Zemin’s visit to Japan in 1998, for
example, resulted in a joint declaration as the third document between China and
Japan, in which the two governments reached an agreement for building a
Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Developments (Jin 2001:
108). However, due to Jiang’s insistence on mentioning the historical issues during
his visit, Jiang’s visit to Japan unfortunately did not improve the bilateral relations.
Instead, it aroused the disputes over wartime history and quarrel over the issue of
“apology” between two countries, further worsening Chinese negative opinions
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towards Japan, and even resulting in Japanese people’s reactive protests against Jiang
personally and China as a whole (Rozman 2002: 111). Since then, the dispute over
“apology” has remained a problem in the background of Sino-Japanese relations and
from time to time was brought to the forefront.
Being aware of the importance of Sino-Japanese relations, to reassure Japanese
people and calm their own public, Chinese government later announced its “smile
diplomacy” to Japan in the fall of 1999 (Rozman 2002: 113). The visibility of
Chinese government’s efforts was Jiang Zemin’s meeting with Japanese travelers on
20 May 1999 and Zhu Rongji’s “friendship tour” to Japan from 12 to 17 October
1999. However, Chinese government’s “smile diplomacy” did not work out among
its public. Chinese Internet posts defied the official goals, criticizing Zhu for his
message that present-day Japanese should not bear responsibility for the militarism
and war against China, and furthermore that China highly appreciated Japan’s ODA
(Quoted from Rozman (2002: 113), Watanabe 2001: 126). Zhu was even called a
traitor by millions of educated young Chinese on the Internet for his assertion to
Japanese reporters that China does not want to hurt Japanese feelings over historical
matters.33
Coming to the 21st century, disputes over history, territory and sovereignty
continually popped up one after another. Starting with the textbook disputes in late
2000 and early 2001, Japanese PM Junichiro Koizumi’s insistence on annual worship
at Yasukuni Shrine from 2001 consistently broke the bilateral relations. In addition,
provoked by the bawdy show of four Japanese who taught and studied at the
Northwest University in China, massive numbers of Chinese university students
demonstrated in the streets in Xi’an in 2003.34 Following in 2004 were ongoing
disputes over economic rights in the East China Sea, riots in Beijing after Japan beat
China in the Asia Cup football finals, and the intrusion into Japanese territorial
waters of a Chinese nuclear attack submarine, as well as the Japanese identification
of China as “a concern” alongside North Korea in the national defense program
guidelines. In 2005, moreover, upon Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the United
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Mainichi Shimbun, November 2, 2000.
In October 2003, a Japanese teacher and three Japanese students presented a bawdy show, which
was taken to insult China, in an formal and serious ceremony, triggering massive protests of numerous
Chinese students from different universities in Xi’an.
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Nations Security Council, a collection of 44 million signatures for a Chinese petition
was alleged in early 2005. In February, Japan and the US released a joint statement,
which was a continuation of the “New Directives for US-Japan Joint Defense” in
1996 and 1997 and included the security of Taiwan into the alliance’s “common
strategic objectives.” The joint-statement not only raised “grave concern” and strong
objections from Beijing, but also annoyed the Chinese populace and further aroused
Chinese anti-Japanese sentiments. Being the last straw, the Japanese Education
Ministry’s approval of a controversial history textbook in April 2005 finally
provoked mass demonstrations against Japan across the Mainland. The nationwide
demonstrations kept growing and lasted long during the last week of March and the
first few weeks of April in 2005 (Hagström 2008-2009: 225).
Strangely, while political and popular relations between China and Japan
deteriorated since the mid-1990s, the economic ties between two countries somehow
grew rapidly and were becoming “hot”. During 1994-2003, Japan had been China’s
largest trading partner while China had been Japan’ s second partner since 1993 and
surpassed the U.S. to become Japan’s largest trading partner in 2005 (Wan 2006:
223). According to Chinese figures, the value of the mutual trade between China and
Japan had grown from $12 billion in 1990 to $83 billion in 2000 when it accounted
for more than 22% of China's total trade. Paralleling this had been a corresponding
growth in Japanese FDI in China. Following their caution in the 1980s Japanese
companies had rapidly increased their investment in China in the 1990s.Japanese
FDI in 1991 came to $579 million and in 1998 it reached $3.2 billion. By the late
1999s, there had been 18,140 Japanese direct investment projects in China and China
had ranked second only to the US as a target for Japanese investment.35
Despite the “hot” economic interactions between two countries in general level,
with poor governmental and popular relations, frequent frictions in different business
sectors to some extent also worsened the bilateral relations. In 1985, for example,
while the student demonstrations in fall seemed provoked by Nakasone’s visits to
Yasukuni Shrine in August, they actually attacked Japan’s “economic invasion” as
well (Whiting 1989: 95). In 2001, the dispute over what the Chinese called
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The figures were drawn from the web site of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/478.html). See Yahuda (2006).
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“discrimination by Japanese firms”36 also caused Chinese negative images of Japan
and added to cause the outburst of the massive anti-Japanese protests across China in
2005.

2.5 Thawing the ice but tensions remain: popular relations warming up with
uncertainty since 2006
When Koizumi stepped down in September 2006, this marked a new phase of
Sino-Japanese relations since it ended the “frozen” bilateral relations that existed
under the leadership of Koizumi (Jiang 2007: 15). To improve the “frozen” state of
the bilateral relation, the new Japanese prime minister, Shinzo Abe, decided to make
his first foreign trip to China (instead of the U.S.) in October 2006, attempting to
break the ice on the bilateral summit that had been suspended for the past five years
and warm up the “cold” political ties between China and Japan. In response, Chinese
premier Wen Jiabao paid an “ice-melting” visit to Japan in April 2007, followed by
the next Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda’s “spring-welcoming” trip to China in
December 2007. To push the bilateral relations into a further stage, Chinese president
Hu Jintao also paid his “warm spring” visit to Japan in May 2008, leading
Sino-Japanese relations back to the peak of amicability in 1970s (He 2009: 288;
Jiang 2007: 18).
With these friendly official gestures and the positive rhetoric of “ice breaking,”
“ice melting,” “spring-welcoming,” and “warm spring,” the popular relations
between two peoples were warming up as well. According to the annual surveys
jointly launched by both sides since 2006, a favorable opinion of Japan among
Chinese had uninterrupted risen from 11.6% in 2006 to 38.3% in 2010.37
Despite of the bilateral relations being warming up at both governmental and
popular levels, none of the bilateral disputes has been actually settled, but only been
shelved. Given the fact, tensions thus remain in current Sino-Japanese relations.
Bilateral tensions always come back when any of these shelved disputes popped up.
In March 2007, for instance, the “comfort women” issue, which was re-politicized
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Mainly referring to Chinese outcries over two issues in 2001: 1) Japan Airlines and All Nippon
Airlines forced Chinese passengers to spend the night in Japanese airports while treating other
passengers differently; 2) Mitsubishi Motors recalled cars in the United States but refused to recall
similar models in China. See Rozman (2002: 121).
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China Daily, August 19-25, 2011.
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after then-Prime Minister Abe’s denial of the Japanese military’s involvement in
forcing women into sexual slavery during the World War II, has raised up certain
levels of tensions between two sides. Similarly, the disputes over wartime history
came up this year again. The Nagoya Mayor publicly denied the Nanjing Massacre
when he met his Chinese counterparts from Nanjing in February 2012, resulting in
tremendous online protests by Chinese internet users and the official objections from
Chinese government.
Coming to the latest days, Sino-Japanese relations have been more often
troubled by the territorial disputes, which tend to be more serious and more
troublesome since territory is both politically and economically important and both
sides tend to hold assertive stands on the issues. The competition over the Chunxiao
gas field (Shirakaba in Japanese) since 2008 has been an important issue between
China and Japan and from time to time attracts great attentions from both the public
and mass media in two sides. Contingent incidents over disputed waters, like the
fishing boat collisions in late 2010, had also caused mass protests in both sides and
eventually affected the bilateral economic exchanges. The ongoing controversies
over “buying” the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in most recent days, for instance, have
doubtlessly caused certain tension between two governments, inevitably worsening
the mutual perceptions between two peoples.
According to the latest survey results published in June 20, 2012 by both
China Daily and Genron NPO, it was indicated that 58.4 % of Chinese respondents
believed territorial issues are a primary cause of the problems hampering the
development of Sino-Japanese relations, followed by 30% of Chinese respondents
taking a lack of mutual trust as a primary cause for poor relations.38 The results of
the same survey in 2011 similarly suggested the recent territorial disputes have been
an bigger factor affecting the bilateral relations. Actually, Chinese favorable attitudes
towards Japan have dropped from 38.3% in 2010 to 28.6% in 2011, reversing the
uninterrupted rising number in the previous four years since 2006.39
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China Daily, June 21, 2012.
China Daily, August 19-25, 2011.
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2.6 Conclusion
The year of 2012 marks the 40th anniversary of the Sino-Japanese
rapprochement. With almost two generations’ efforts in the past 40 years,
Sino-Japanese relations in general have been improved at least in political and
economical sectors even though tensions still remain.40 Given both regional and
worldwide challenges under the globalization and with deeper economic
interdependence, both Chinese and Japanese governments have shown their goodwill
to sustain and improve the bilateral relations. Sino-Japanese relations thus currently
keep manageable with normal political interactions and frequent economical
exchanges between two sides.
The bilateral relations between Chinese and Japanese peoples, however, seem
more complicated. As Whiting (1989:126) concluded, mutual perceptions between
peoples do not always accord with actual circumstances, especially when they are
embedded in a relationship plagued by historical and emotional tensions. Therefore,
despite the friendly official gestures of two governments and the interdependent
economic ties between two countries, it is to some extent true that the popular
relations between two peoples so far remain at the stage of shallow reconciliation
without genuine mutual trust and institutionalized interactions. As Wan (2006: 2)
described, Sino-Japanese relations up to now still remain dispute-prone, cyclical and
distant psychologically at popular level.
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As the latest survey suggested, despite the drop of Chinese favorable attitudes towards Japan in
2011, this figure have increased (to 35.4%) again this year. See Genron NPO, June 20, 2012,
http://www.genron-npo.net/world/genre/cat119/2012-a.html, firstly accessed on June 21, 2012.
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Chapter 3
Chinese Patriotic Education Since 1989

3.1 Introduction
With a brief historical review of the fluctuating Sino-Japanese relations and
Chinese perceptions of Japan since 1972 provided in the previous chapter, this
chapter comes to address the two research questions on Chinese patriotic education:
1) what is Chinese patriotic education since 1989 about? 2) what information about
Japan does the post-1989 patriotic education intend to teach Chinese youths? By
using comparative and content analysis on the official documents on patriotic
education and the history of Japan in the history curriculum in secondary schools
before and after 1989, this chapter at first tries to examine whether or not the
patriotic education itself at the official level has been purposely infused with modern
China’s “humiliated history” in general and an anti-Japanese context in particular.
Secondly, by using an analysis of the new history curriculum since 2001 along with
interviews that I conducted with history textbook designers from the People’s
Education Press in PRC and history teachers from secondary schools in Nanjing and
Shenzhen, this chapter further analyzes how patriotic education is actually
implemented in schools and what information about Japan and Sino-Japanese
relations are actually taught under the current reformed history curriculum.
3.2 The “Patriotic Education Campaign” since 1989
During the post-Mao reform in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, with Deng
Xiaoping’s reform and opening-up policy, China for the first time tried to set up a
market – oriented economy system and “fully” opened its “national door” [guomen]
to the outside world. This left Chinese people with much more freedom to be
exposed to liberal and democratic ideas. Also, during the post-Mao reform period,
Deng’s efforts to “reassess” Maoism so as to eradicate all ideological and
psychological obstacles to economic reform unexpectedly resulted in the demise of
the official ideology (Zhao 1998: 288). With more influences from the outside world
on the one hand and the demise of the official communist ideology on the other, it
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has been then argued by many scholars that the large-scale anti-government
demonstrations in the spring of 1989 were a result of the bankruptcy of the
communist official ideology. In accordance with these arguments, the CCP regime
had tried almost all ways to step up its state-led political education and had thereby
launched a “patriotic education campaign” in all sectors of Chinese society,
especially in schools, in the face of perceived challenges to its authority (Gries 2004;
Whiting 1995; Zhao 1998, 2004; Zheng 1999).
To some extent, it is true that the biggest lesson the Chinese leadership learned
from the Tiananmen Incident in 1989 was the ineffectiveness of its political and
ideological education in the 1980s. As Deng concluded after the Incident,
“During the past ten years (the post-Mao reform period), the biggest mistakes
had been made in the sector of education. By ‘education’, I referred to the
ideological and political education (sixiang zhengzhi jiaoyu).”
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The pro-democracy movements, which were mainly organized and joined by
students in 1989, somehow did teach the CCP leadership an important lesson in that
they had to some extent failed in their ideological-political education, particularly in
fostering students’ belief in communist ideology and the legitimacy of CCP authority.
Ironically, as Zhao (1998:289) put it, the pro-democracy demonstrators in
Tiananmen Square, while confronting the government, claimed that patriotism drove
them to take to the streets. It thus seems that the previous efforts of the CCP in its
ideological-political education did not totally fail but at least succeeded in teaching
Chinese people to be patriotic. Inspired by this, as Zhao (1998: 289) further
suggested, patriotism was re-discovered and pragmatically used by the CCP leaders
to sustain the legitimacy of the CCP’s authority as well as the stability of Chinese
society.
Following these ideas, it is argued that a “patriotic education campaign” was
launched by Deng and his successor (Jiang Zemin) after the Tiananmen Incident in
1989 with a number of official documents and regulations pertaining to patriotic
education being released by both the CCP Central Committee (hereafter CCPCC)
and the State Education Commission (which was replaced as the Ministry of
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Editorial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Dengxiaoping Wenxuan
(Disanjuan) [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (Vol.3)], (Beijing, 1993-1994), p. 56.
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Education in 1998, and hereafter the MOE) since the early 1990s (Zhao 1998, 2004).
In April 1990, as a starting point of the patriotic education in new era, the MOE
issued “A Few Opinions on Further Strengthening Primary and Secondary School
Moral Education Work” [Guanyu Jinyubu Jiaqiang Zhongxiaoxue Deyu Gongzuo de
Jidian Yijian], calling on schools to emphasize moral education, particularly patriotic
education, and offering detailed instructions on the content and implementation of
the patriotic education (Zheng 2011: 77). Following up was a “Notice on Fully Using
Culture Relics to Conduct Education in Patriotism and Revolutionary Traditions”
[Guanyu Chongfen Yunyong Wenwu Jinxing Aiguozhuyi he Geming Chuantong
Jiaoyu de Tongzh], issued by CCPCC in August 1991. The “Campaign” was more
evident after Deng’s southern China tour in early 1992. Soon after Deng’s Southern
China Tour, in January 1993, the MOE enacted the “Program for China’s Education
Reform and Development” [Zhongguo Jiaoyu Gaige yu Fazhan Jihua], laying out
patriotism as a guiding principle for China’s educational reform (Zhao 1998: 292).
One year later, in August 1994, the CCP Central Committee released a key official
document – “Outline on the Implementation of Patriotic Education” [Aiguo Jiaoyu
Shixing Gangyao], leading to a climax of the nationwide “patriotic education
campaign” (He 2007: 57).
By carrying out these official documents to all sectors of Chinese society, the
CCP leaders have indeed tried to reform and strengthen the patriotic education in
China since the early 1990s in order to sustain Chinese people’s love and support for
the Chinese motherland and the CCP authority. However, it does not mean that
Chinese government’s emphasis on patriotic education or political ideological
education started after 1989 as well.
As a matter of fact, soon after the post-Mao period of reform and openness
began with the Third Plenary Session of the Communist Party in 1978, China’s
leaders had been aware of the perceived need for patriotic education in China.
Therefore, both the CCPCC and the MOE had in fact issued certain official
documents to strengthen the ideological and political education to deal with a
number of perceived problems with Chinese society and citizens, such as “worship of
foreign things,” “national nihilism,” and a lack of confidence in socialism in China,
which were mainly caused by the past experience of the Cultural Revolution and the
current openness to the outside world (Guo, eds. 1995: 602).The earliest document
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on political education after the Cultural Revolution – “Ministry of Education Opinion
on Improving and Strengthening Secondary School Political Education Courses”—
for example, was released by the MOE in September 1980 (Guo, eds. 1995: 628).
Three years later, in both July and August 1983, the CCPCC and the MOE
successively released relevant documents on patriotic education in particular.42 A
notice on improving and strengthening the teaching of history and geography courses
in secondary school, for example, was also issued by the MOE in the same year so as
to stimulate students’ national pride and patriotism.43
Unfortunately, due to the problems existing with teachers, the content, and the
teaching methods of moral education as well as the inadequate coordination between
schools, society and families, the patriotic and moral education in schools before
1989 was somehow not effective, and thus partially contributing to students’
large-scale anti-government movements in 1989 (Fairbrother 2002: 91; Zheng
2011:77).
Given the lessons from the Tiananmen Incident, which led to the perceived
needs for patriotic education in the Chinese society, China’s leaders therefore called
for a reform and strengthening of patriotic education in the whole Chinese society
and launched such a so called “patriotic education campaign” after 1989 (Zhao 1998),
or in Zheng’s (2011: 75) words, “Chinese patriotic education in the new era.”
Chinese patriotic education since 1989, as prescribed in the 1994 Outline, was
all-encompassing, with all actors throughout Chinese society called upon to
contribute to the implementation of patriotic education. Schools, from the daycare
level to the university level, were specifically called on to create a lively atmosphere
of patriotism in which all courses were to be infused with patriotic education
(Editorial Committee of CCPCC 1999: 925). As the major objects of school
education, Chinese youths were taken as the focus of patriotic education, and were
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They are respectively “Opinion of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Propaganda
Department and CCP Central Committee Secretariat Research Office on Strengthening Patriotic
Propaganda Education” [Zhonggong Zhongyang Xuanchuan Bu, Zhonggong Zhongyang Shuji Chu
Yanjiu Shi Guanyu Jiaqiang Aiguozhuyi Xuanchuan Jiaoyu de Yijian] issued on July 2, 1983 and
“Ministry of Education Notice on the Study and Implementation of the ‘Opinion on Strengthening
Patriotic Propaganda Education’”[Jiaoyu Bu Guanyu Xuexi Guanche ‘Guanyu Jiaqiang Aiguozhuyi
Xuanchuan Jiaoyu de Yijian] issued on August 24, 1983.
43
See “Ministry of Education Notice on Improving and Strengthening the Teaching of Secondary
School History and Geography Course” [Jiaoyu Bu Guanyu Gaijin Jiaqiang Zhongxue Lishi he Dili
Ke Jiaoxue de Tongzhi] issued on August 1, 1983.
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targeted by television, movies, music, dramas, arts, and stories which used rich and
vivid imagery to provide patriotic education to young people (Editorial Committee of
CCPCC 1999: 925-926). According to the 1994 Outline and relevant documents,
museums, memorial halls, martyrs’ memorials, revolutionary war campaign and
battle memorials, protected cultural and historical sites, important scenic spots,
important development projects that demonstrate the nation’s achievements in
developing material and spiritual civilization and so on should also be developed as
patriotic education bases and allow school-organized teacher and student groups to
visit free of charge.44
The content of Chinese patriotic education stipulated in the 1994 outline was, as
Zhao (1998: 296) put it, wide-ranging with two dominant themes: 1). Chinese
tradition and history; 2) national unity and territorial integrity. Chinese students were
expected to learn China’s traditional civilization, culture, customs, traditions, and
philosophies as well as current national conditions and policies, including economic
and political systems and policies, policy on reunification, nationalities policies,
military affairs, foreign affairs, society, culture, population, and national resources
(Fairbrother 2002: 95).
The functions, or the goals of patriotic education, which were demonstrated in
the 1994 Outline and also analyzed by Fairbrother (2002:93-94), mainly cover the
following four aspects: 1) patriotic education contributes to the maintenance of
territorial integrity, national unity, and national pride, responding to problems
indicating a lack of respect for the nation among some Chinese citizens; 2) patriotic
education is a vehicle for transmitting knowledge and appropriate attitudes about
international relations; 3) patriotic education fulfills a function of maintaining the
socialist system and state legitimacy, in response to the perceived appearance or
influx of a variety of negative societal influences; 4) patriotic education performs a
progressive function, encouraging contributions to China’s program of development
and modernization.
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See “Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Propaganda Department, State Education
Commission, Department of Culture, Department of Civil Administration, Communist Youth League
Central Committee, and National Bureau of Cultural Relics Notice on Fully Utilizing Cultural Relics
in the Implementation of Patriotic Education and Education in Revolutionary Traditions” [Zhonggong
Zhongyang Xuanchuan Bu, Guojia Jiaowei, Wenhua Bu, Minzheng Bu, Gongqingtuan Zhongyang,
Guojia Wenwu Ju Guanyu Chongfen Yunyong Wenwu Jinxing Aiguozhuyi he Geming Chuantong
Jiaoyu de Tongzhi] issued on August 28, 1991.
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As mentioned in the introductory chapter, patriotism, in Chinese, aiguozhuyi,
literally means “loving the state”. In China, “love for the state” is certainly equated
with love for the People’s Republic of China, and as such is indistinguishable from
love for socialism and love for the Communist Party (Fairbrother 2002: 96). In the
PRC official discourse, patriotism in China is differentiated from nationalism and
simply used under the context of a love for the socialist state and the Communist
Party. In the period of reform and openness, it is particularly pointed out that in the
post-1989 patriotic education curriculum, patriotism cannot be equated with “narrow
nationalism.” Instead, as Fairbother (2002) further illustrated based on his
understanding of the 19 official documents pertaining to Chinese patriotic education
which he has examined,
“While fostering China’s superior achievements and supporting her own
interests, [Chinese]modern patriotism allows for the study and absorption of
advanced culture from the world’s nations, including capitalist nations. This is
patriotic because it allows for China’s further progress and development. Regarding
knowledge and appropriate attitudes to hold about foreign nations and the world
system, the basic message to be conveyed to students is that China upholds world
peace. Students are to learn of China’s support for the Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence, policy of peaceful diplomatic relations, and support for friendly,
cooperative relations with the people of other nations”(p.96).

3.3 An official emphasis on the history of modern and contemporary China in
the post -1989 patriotic education
Following the aforementioned analysis on the CCP leaders’ pragmatic
promotion of patriotic education since 1987, it is suggested that as an important
source of the CCP regime’s legitimacy, the history of modern China has been
emphasized in the post-1989 “patriotic education campaign” (Callahan 2007: 186;
Zhao 2004: 219).
By comparing the most important documents pertaining to patriotic education
released by the CCPCC before and after 1989, it is evident that while the targets of
the patriotic education remain the same – Chinese youths, as Figure 3.1 shows, the
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content of patriotic education in different periods does vary from each other.45

Figure 3.1. Comparisons between two official documents on patriotic
education issued by the CCPCC before and after 1989

Date
Content

Opinion of the Chinese Communist Party Central
Committee Propaganda Department and the CCP
Central Committee Secretariat Research Office on
Strengthening Patriotic Propaganda Education
[ZhonggongZhongyang Xuanchuan Bu, Zhonggong
Zhongyang Shuji Chu Yanjiu Shi Guanyu Jiaqiang
Aiguozhuyi Xuanchuan Jiaoyu de Yijian]
July 2, 1983
1. A new look for (Chinese) motherland and the
Developments and Achievements after 1978
2. Modeling deeds of heroic figures and advanced
community
3. Successful experience of development
4. Magnificent Chinese mountains and rivers as
well as places of historic interest and scenic
beauty
5. Significant historical events and famous
historical figures
6. Outstanding (Chinese)artists and their works
since ancient time
7. Outstanding (Chinese) scientists and their
contribution since ancient time
8. (Chinese) cultural relics since ancient time
9. The historical contribution of all ethnic groups
to Chinese motherland
10. (Chinese) patriots living in foreign countries
and foreign patriots in the world

Outline on the Implementation of
Patriotic Education [Aiguo Zhuyi
Jiaoyu Shishi Gangyao]

August 8, 1994
1. The long history of the Chinese
nationality, especially modern and
contemporary history
2. (Chinese) tradition and culture
3. The basic outlines of CCP policies
and the great achievements of
modernization in China
4. Chinese national conditions,
especially in the context of the
global environment
5. Democracy and legal system in
socialist China
6. National defense and security in
China
7. Unity among different ethnicity
groups
8. The policy of “Peaceful
Unification and One Country, Two
Systems”.

In the 1994 Outline, Chinese history (especially the history of modern and
contemporary China), the CCP’s ideology and the national conditions are highlighted,
while these salient themes were not particularly or clearly illustrated in the 1983
Guideline.
Also by comparing two more significant official documents issued by the MOE
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Both the CCPCC and the MOE also had their most important document in different periods. For the
CCPCC, for instance, the “Opinion of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Propaganda
Department and the CCP Central Committee Secretariat Research Office on Strengthening Patriotic
Propaganda Education” [Zhonggong Zhongyang Xuanchuan Bu, Zhonggong Zhongyang Shuji Chu
Yanjiu Shi Guanyu Jiaqiang Aiguozhuyi Xuanchuan Jiaoyu de Yijian] issued in 1983 could be taken as
the most important document for patriotic education since it provided most comprehensive
instructions for the implementations of patriotic education in all sectors of Chinese society, while the
“Outline on the Implementation of Patriotic Education” [Aiguo Zhuyi Jiaoyu Shishi Gangyao] issued in
1994, is believed to have marked the peak of the patriotic education campaign after 1989. See, He
(2007:57) and Zhao (1998: 292).
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respectively in 1983 and 1991, which were supposed to follow the ideas of the
CCPCC but mainly focused on the implementation of patriotic education in
educational sectors, I discovered similar differences. In the MOE’s 1983 document,
there was only one sentence used to describe the history course (especially the
history of modern and contemporary China) as an important and useful source for
patriotic education. 46 However, in the MOE’s 1991 document, there were five
paragraphs used to stress the importance of Chinese history (especially the history of
modern and contemporary China) for the implementation of patriotic education,
taking up more than half of the content of the document, which in total had 9
paragraphs.47
Regarding to the impacts of the Tiananmen Incident on the patriotic history
curriculum and the CCP leaders’ efforts to use both Chinese history and the current
national conditions to foster Chinese people’s patriotism and its own legitimacy,
obvious contrasts were also found between two official documents respectively
issued by the MOE in August 1983 and November 1989 for strengthening the
teaching of history and geography class in primary and secondary schools. In the
MOE’s 1989 document, the lessons from the Tiananmen Incident, which were
concluded as preventing and resisting “the intervention of capitalist liberalization”
and “democratic countries’ peaceful revolutions,” were added as the main reasons to
explain why schools should strengthen the teaching of history (especially the history
of modern and contemporary China) and geography in schools, while these were not
mentioned in the 1983 document at all.48
Finally, the importance attached to the history of modern and contemporary
China was much more evident in the MOE’s document which was named as “State
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See “Ministry of Education Notice on the Study and Implementation of the ‘Opinion on
Strengthening Patriotic Propaganda Education’” [Jiaoyu Bu Guanyu Xuexi Guanche ‘Guanyu
Jiaqiang Aiguozhuyi Xuanchuan Jiaoyu de Yijian de Tongzhi] issued on August 24, 1983.
47
See “State Education Commission Office Opinion on Further Developinfg Patriotic Education
Activities in Primary and Secondary Schools” [Guojia Jiaowei Bangongting Guanyu Zai
Zhongxiaoxue Jinyibu Kaizhan Aiguozhuyi Jiaoyu Huodong de Yijian] issued on April 25, 1991.
48
See “State Education Commission Opinion on Strengthening the Teaching of Ideological and
Political Education and Education on National Conditions in Primary and Secondary Language,
History, Geography, and Other Courses” [Guojia Jiaowei Guanyu Zai Zhongxiaoxue Yuwen,
Lishi,Dili Deng Xueke Jiaoxue Zhong Jiaqiang Sixiang Zhengzhi Jiaoyu he Guoqing Jiaoyu de Yijian]
issued on November 8, 1989. Also see “Ministry of Education Notice on Improving and
Strengthening the Teaching of Secondary School History and Geography Courses” [Jiaoyubu Guanyu
Gaijin Jiaqiang Zhongxue Lishi he Dili Ke Jiaoxue de Tongzhi] issued on August 1, 1983.
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Education Commission Notice on the Promulgation of the Preliminary Draft of the
‘General Outline on Strengthening Education in Modern and Contemporary History
and National Conditions’” in 1991. The document directly put it as a great strategy to
strengthen the education on the history of modern and contemporary China and
national conditions among the primary and secondary school students and called up
the entire Chinese society to carry out this strategy thoroughly and efficiently.
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The history of modern and contemporary China began with the first Opium War
between China’s Qing Dynasty and the British Government in 1840 and continues to
date. China began its contemporary history with the set-up of the new PRC in
October 1949. But before that, the 109-year long history of modern China was
known as “the century of humiliation.” During this “humiliated century”, both China
and the Chinese people had been through numerous traumatic wars and had suffered
a great deal from the invasions of western imperialism and Japanese militarism. The
Communist Party, which was formally established in 1921, had played an important
role in safeguarding the Chinese people and the motherland through its determined
resistance against foreign invaders, especially the Japanese militarists, during the
wartime, and had finally won victory in the resistance against Japanese militarists.
Thus, the nationalist credentials of the CCP are inextricably intertwined with the
Chinese resistance to Japan’s invasion. As many scholars believed, this explains why
CCP leaders emphasized the history of modern and contemporary China in their
patriotic education campaign since 1989 (Gong and Teo 2010; Hamada 2003;Hughes
2008; Moore 2010; Gries 1999; Reilly 2004; Wang 2008).
Compared to the emphasis on the history of modern and contemporary China
in both 1980s and 1990s, the history of ancient China and the world, where Japan
was mentioned as one of the neighboring countries of ancient China and one of the
countries in the world, were relatively less stressed. However, when compared to the
history textbooks before 1978, the history of ancient China and the world had been
more fairly treated in both the 1980s’ and 1990s’ history curricula.
After the new PRC was established, Chinese history curricula were largely
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See “State Education Commission Notice on the Promulgation of the Preliminary Draft of the
‘General Outline on Strengthening Education in Modern and Contemporary History and National
Conditions’” [Guojia Jiaowei Guanyu Banfa ‘Zhongxiaoxue Jiaqiang Zhongguo Jindai, Xiandaishi ji
Guoqing Jiaoyu de Zongti Gangyao’ (Chugao) de Tongzhi] issued on August 27, 1991.
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influenced by the Soviet Union curricula models and separated the curricula into
“Chinese history” and “”world history (Muller 2011: 39). Before 1978, Chinese
history curricula were written with classical Marxist history concepts and
class-struggle principles. The world history thus was focused on the “daily growing
peace camp” under the Soviet Union’s leadership and anti-colonial liberation
movements and their necessary success (LSJ 2001b: 107). In this way, the West
(including Japan) were either not mentioned or just appeared only in the context of
imperialist aggression against China. After 1978, a new framework of history
curricula started to emerge. In 1980s’ history textbooks, the successes of the
capitalist countries were now conceded, and their innovative power was
acknowledged. Structurally, new chapters on Western science, literature and art were
also added though they were marked as “not relevant” for the examination (LSJ
2001b:487). In 1990s’ history textbooks, Chinese history was to be taught in an
ancient-modern ratio of 1:1, whereas world history was to remain mainly modern
(LSJ 2001b: 512).
As a result, both Japan’s friendly and bad relationships with China in ancient
time were taught in 1980s’ and 1990s’ history classes. The story of Jianzhen and his
trip to Japan in Tang Dynasty were well known to students and while Japanese
pirates’ existence in East China Sea in Ming Dynasty was also acknowledged. As
one of the capitalist countries in modern time and one of the militarist countries
which launched the World War II, Japan’s success in capitalist reforms was praised
while its inhuman Fascism in the World War II was condemned in the history
curricula. In both

the history curricula in 1980s and 1990s, Japan’s Meiji

Restoration, for example, was detailed and took up a chapter with 3 three lessons in
the textbooks on world history. Accordingly, the situations of Japanese society in the
1850s and during the Meiji Restoration were also introduced in details as well.50
Therefore, although it is evident that the history of modern and contemporary
China was emphasized in the patriotic history curricula after 1989, the history of
ancient China and the world, where more positive information about Japan was
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See Quanrizhi Zhongxue Lishi Jiaoxue Dagang (Teaching Guidelines for History Education in
Full-time Middle Schools) (1986), p. 88; and 9 Nian Yiwu Jiaoyu Quanrizhi Chuji Zhongxue Lishi
Jiaoxue Dagang (Teaching Guidelines for History Education in Full-time Middle Schools of
Nine-year Compulsory Education)(1992), p. 39.
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mentioned, was also taught in the history classes before and after 1989, suggesting
that the Chinese history curricula after 1978 overall was relatively moderate and
neutral when describing Japan.

3.4 The War of Resistance against Japan had been highlighted and the
discourse of Japan’s atrocities had kept consistent before and after 1989.
With an evident emphasis on the history of modern and contemporary China at
the official level, the War of Resistance against Japan during 1931-1945, which was
claimed as China’s first complete victory against foreign invaders by Jiang Zemin
and thus is central to the CCP’s legitimacy,51 is suggested to have been highlighted
in the patriotic history curriculum after 1989. With “self-glorifying and
other-maligning myths,” it is also believed that the “post-1989 patriotic education
campaign” has reversed the previous cover-up of Japanese atrocities in Chinese
history textbooks, which was mostly due to the need of a good Sino-Japanese
relationship in face with the threat from the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and
went to another extreme of arousing a sense of Chinese victimhood and demonizing
Japan in 1990s (He 2007: 58-59; Reilly 2004: 280).
By examining the textbooks on China’s modern history for secondary schools,
which were published by the People’s Education Press (hereafter PEP) – the biggest
official press for designing and publishing guidelines for school curriculum (before
2001) and all kinds of textbooks for schools – in 1985 and 1995, 52 it is
unsurprisingly found that the War of Resistances Against Japan was actually the
dominant theme of both textbooks, taking up almost half of the content of both
textbooks (See Figure 3.2 and 3.3).53
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See “Jiang Zemin’ s Speech at the Veterans’ Symposium, August 25, 1995,” in Tian Huan, eds.
Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji [Archives on Post-WWII Sino-Japanese Relations (Vol 2)],
(Beijing, 1997), p.939.
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Before 2001, under one history curriculum guideline, there may be different versions of history
textbooks successively published by PEP in different years. The content of these different versions of
textbooks are close and sometimes almost the same. For comparing textbooks in the 1980s and 1990s,
here, I adopted the 1985 Zhongguo Lishi (Disice) [Chinese History (Vol. 4)] for junior secondary
schools under the 1978 Guideline and the 1995 Zhongguo Lishi (Disice) [Chinese History (Vol. 4)]for
junior secondary schools under the 1993 Guideline for examinations .
53
In PEP’s Zhongguo Lishi (Disice) [Chinese History (Vol. 4)] (1985), there were a total of four
sections, among which the section III was entirely devoted to the War of Resistance against Japan with
the part on Japan’s atrocities included and this topic covered nearly half of the section II. In Zhongguo
Lishi (Disice) [Chinese History (Vol. 4)] (1995), however, there were a total of 17 lessons, among
which seven lessons were about the War of Resistance against Japan and one lesson was about Japan’s
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Figure 3.2

Figure 3.3

The catalog of 1985 history textbook

The catalog of 1995 history textbook

As suggested by Li Weike (2011:140), one of the leading editors of history
textbooks in PEP, “from a Chinese perspective, the War of Resistance against Japan
marked the first time in the modern era that the nation was completely victorious in
its many wars of resistance against foreign aggression. It, therefore, occupies a
central place in modern Chinese history.” Moreover, “China’s War of Resistance
against Japan was an important part of the Second World War and made major
contributions to the victory in the global war against fascism. Thus, in both Chinese
and world history, this war is of great significance and is given extensive treatment in
PRC textbooks.”
Regarding the details about Japan’s atrocities, however, in the 1985 textbook,
Japanese

militarists’

atrocities

were

mainly

concluded

under

two

subtitles—“Japanese Militarists ‘Mop up’ [Da Saodang] the Anti-Japanese Bases
[Kangri Genjudi]” and “Japanese Militarists Economically Plunder the Occupied
Areas.” About 6 pages of this textbook were given for detailed elaborations but with
no pictures.54 In the 1995 textbook, however, a particular lesson with also 6 pages
was used to detail the Japanese militarists’ cruel rules, inhuman atrocities and
barbarianism in the occupied areas with vivid pictures and specific examples, such as

invasion in China in particular.
54
PEP (1985), Zhongguo Lishi (Disice) [Chinese History (Vol. 4)], pp. 112-117.
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the Nanjing Massacre, Japanese Unit 731 and so forth.55
Even though many more specific examples and vivid pictures about Japan’s
atrocities during their invasions of China were provided in the 1995 textbook, these
details took up a relatively low proportion of the textbooks when compared to the
elaborate details focusing on the War of Resistances against Japan.56 These details
about Japan’s atrocities, as suggested both by Reilly (2004:285) and by one of the
textbook designers I interviewed in PEP, were brought about with a surge of
academic researches on wartime history and Japan’s atrocities since the early 1980s
in China in reaction to Japan’s revisionism of the later 1970s and 1980s. Take the
research on the Nanjing Massacre as an example, as suggested by Zhang Xianwen,
one Chinese historian who headed the earliest research on the Nanjing Massacre in
Nanjing University,
“In response to the textbook disputes with Japan in 1982, the earliest effort at
academic scholarship (mainly conducted by four scholars in world history in
Nanjing University at the very beginning) on the Nanjing Massacre and Japanese
atrocities in China came in the mid-1980s, which was much later than Japan’s side.
It was thus much later when the Nanjing Massacre was written into the history
textbooks. So, Chinese populace did not know about the Nanjing Massacre until the
early 1990s.”57
What is more, the descriptions of Japan’s atrocities and invasions in China in
the 1990s’ textbooks did not vary so much from the 1980s’ ones. The descriptions of
the September 18th Incident (also known as the Manchurian Incident) in 1985 and
1995 textbooks, for example, were quite similar in terms of the discourse on Japan’s
roles in causing the Incident.
In 1985 history textbook, it was written:
In 1929, a severe financial crisis burst out in the Imperialist World
(diguozhuyi shijie). In order to get rid of the financial crisis, Japanese
Imperialists decided to invade the Northeast (also known as Manchuria) of
our country (China) and occupy the entire China step by step, when Chiang
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PEP (1995), Zhongguo Lishi (Disice) [Chinese History (Vol. 4)], pp. 64-69.
1:7 in ratio
57
Author’s interviews with Zhang Xianwen, who headed the earliest researches in Nanjing Massacre
in China and now serves as the Director of the Research Institute of History in Nanjing University, Jan.
9, 2011.
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Kai Shek was focused on his domestic wars (with the Chinese Communist
Party). With the intention to turn China into its colony, the Japanese
Kwantung army designed a conspiracy and bombed the South Manchuria
Railway at Liutiaohu, on the outskirts of Shenyang (also known as Mukden),
during the night of September 18, 1931. The Kwantung army then called the
bombing the work of Chinese forces and, in the name of self-defense,
quickly seized control of Shenyang. The September 18th Incident so
happened.
( Zhongguo lishi (disice)1985: 67)
In 1995 history textbook, it was written:
In 1929, a severe financial crisis burst out in the Capitalist World. In order
to get rid of the financial crisis, Japanese imperialists strengthened their
invasions in China. During the night of September 18, 1931, the Japanese
Kwantung army bombed the South Manchuria Railway at Liutiaohu and
called the bombing the work of Chinese forces. Taking this as an excuse, the
Japanese Kwantung army soon embarked on military action to the base
camp of Chinese northeast military and occupied Shenyang. This is so
called the “September 18th Incident.”
(Zhongguo Lishi (Disice)1995:32)
Comparing the above descriptions on the September 18th Incident in 1985’s and
1995’s history textbooks, it is easier to find the differences between the discourses on
Chiang Kai Shek (or Kuomintang) than the differences between the discourses on
Japan. To the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which fought a bloody battle to gain
its ruling position, Kuomintang was taken as a rival after the new PRC was founded,
and thus, in the depiction of the War of Resistance against the Japanese in Chinese
history textbooks, many paragraphs were used to condemn the KMT for
collaborating with, or not resisting, the Japanese Army (Su 2011:148). This intention
to take KMT as a rival or the “other” was still evident in the 1980s’ history textbooks.
With the changes of the relationships between mainland and Taiwan and for the
purpose of national unification, however, the historical discourses on the roles of
Kuomintang in resistances against foreign invaders had been changed in the 1990s’
history textbooks. In 1990s, the history textbooks emphasized the cooperation more
than the conflicts between the KMT and CCP and the KMT was instead mentioned
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for its positive role in resisting foreign invaders in the textbooks.
Therefore, although the War of Resistance against Japan was highlighted and
the descriptions of Japan’s atrocities in history textbooks have been consistently
negative and detailed, the Chinese government did not have the intention to stress or
exaggerate Japanese invasions in China in history textbooks. As Li Weike (2011:144)
further suggested, the descriptions of the wars and Japan’ atrocities in China actually
intend to stress Chinese determined resistance against foreign invaders and that
Japan’s instigation of war and massacre of Chinese people were inhumane violations
of international law, but never placing an emphasis or exaggeration on the atrocities
themselves.

3.5 A comprehensive view of Japan in the new history curriculum since 2001
Coming to the beginning of the 21st century, with the goal of an “emotional and
value-based” education and for the purpose to turn China’s basic education from
being exam-oriented to quality-oriented, China has undertaken a curriculum reform
based on The Compendium of Curriculum Standards for Compulsory Education
(tentative) [Jichu Jiaoyu Kecheng Gaige Gangyao (Shixing)] enacted by the MOE in
2001 (2001a, quoted from Li 2011: 138).
By “emotional and value-based ” education, in accordance with the new history
curriculum standards, two aspects of emotion and values are highlighted in the new
history curriculum: 1) the understanding of Chinese national conditions, an
identification with national history and culture, a cultivation of a national spirit and
patriotic sentiments; 2) an understanding of the diversities of human history and
society, comprehension of and respect for cultural traditions of different regions,
countries and nationalities, absorption of the outstanding achievements of human
civilization and the formation of an open world-view. (2001b, quoted from Li 2011:
143)
The History Curriculum Standards for full-time compulsory education
[Quanrizhi Jiaoyu Lishi Kecheng Biaozhun] (hereafter HCS) were issued by the
MOE in 2001, setting guidelines for teaching arrangements and textbook compilation.
With the HCS, secondary school history textbook compilation in China has greatly
changed from the original “one syllabus, one version” to “one syllabus, many
editions” (Li 2011: 137). Since 2001, not only PEP, but also other publishing houses
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and presses could now enjoy autonomy for editing textbooks. Although textbooks
compilation and writing must strictly correspond to the HCS and pass through the
examinations of the National (or Provincial) Committee for Elementary, Junior and
Senior Secondary School Textbook Approval [Quanguo (huo Shengji) Zhongxiaoxue
Jiaocai Shending Weiyuanhui], the diversification of textbooks is encouraged by the
history curriculum reform (2001a).
As a result of the history curriculum reform, the history textbook editions
available for junior secondary school have so far expanded into 10 versions. 58
Concerning senior high schools, four kinds of senior secondary school history
textbooks have been published.59 These different versions of textbooks are now
competing with each other as the local governments are permitted to choose among
the published textbooks autonomously (Su 2011: 150).
With a paradigm shift from political history to economic, cultural and social
history in history academic research, the history curriculum reform has also
enhanced content related to social, scientific, educational and cultural history, while
still keeping its emphasis on political history (Su 2011: 149). Therefore, under this
new curriculum, the history courses have been integrated with other courses, such as
“science”, “society”, or “geography”, resulting in a series of new experimental
history textbooks in schools. Furthermore, in many of these new history textbooks,
topical arrangements crossing national borders and integrating Chinese and world
history are adopted, in contrast to the chronological and regionally divided approach
found in history textbooks written during the 1980s and 1990s (Li 2011: 137).
Given such “radical” history curriculum reform, what are the “radical” changes
in the imagery regarding Japan? How is Japan taught in classes using the new history
curriculum?
As previously discussed, in both 1980s’ and 1990s’ history textbooks, the
history of modern and contemporary China was emphasized and the War of
Resistance against Japan was highlighted with Japan’s atrocities in China detailed,
while the history of Japan as one of the neighboring countries of China since ancient

58

For details about each version, see Su Zhiling, “The ‘Others’ in Chinese History Textbooks: A Focus
on the Relationship between China and Japan,” in Goteling Muller, ed. Designing History in East
Asian Textbooks: Identity Politics and Transnational Aspirations, (NY, 2011), pp.149-150.
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Ibid.
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times and the history of Japan as one of the countries in the world were either almost
ignored or less mentioned. Coming to the 21st century, with the curriculum reform,
content about Japan in Chinese textbooks, however, started to change (Su 2011: 147).
Due to the curriculum reform, there have been various editions of history textbooks
being used in different cities and different schools in China. Different editions of
textbooks, though all adhere to HCS guidelines, have different arrangements and
space distributions for different historical topics and events.
Regarding to the content relevant to the history of the War of Resistance against
Japan and Japan’s atrocities in China during the wartime, it is noted that compared to
the previous editions, the length of these sections has been reduced either due to the
topical arrangement of the content or the integration with other courses in the new
history textbooks. The textbooks published by most of the press in Shanghai and by
Beijing Normal University Press, for example, have reduced the space allotted to the
content about the War of Resistance against Japan and Japanese atrocities due to the
integrations between history and other sciences courses (Su 2011: 152). The
textbooks published by PEP also reduced the space covering these two topics due to
the topical arrangement of the new textbooks.60
Looking at the most recent history curriculum standards, which were recently
published by the MOE in 2011 and must be fully followed during the textbook
compilation process, the War of Resistance against Japan and Japan’s atrocities, such
as the Nanjing Massacre, are still listed as a dominant topic of modern Chinese
history the same as before. What is different in the new history curriculum, however,
is that it includes specific suggestions for history teachers engaged in hands-on
learning activities outside the classroom, such as discussions in classes, watching
movies and documentaries, and visiting historical relics and living war victims, etc.61
Besides, Japan’s ancient, modern and contemporary history are all partially included
in the respective sections of world history, depicting both Japan’s contributions and
its harms to the world and showing a much more comprehensive view of Japan.62
Therefore, as Su (2011: 152) concluded, regarding to the content and discourse on
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Japan, most of the history curricula currently circulating in China are characterized
with:
“While keeping their condemnation of the Japanese invasion, Chinese history
textbooks also began to praise Japan’s modern reforms, such as the Meiji
Restoration, the democratic reforms after World War II, the successful economic
recovery and the combination of traditional and modern culture. Japan’s
developmental aid to other countries, including to China, is also appreciated in
today’s textbooks.”
In current PEP’s history, by contrasting two pictures of a Japanese soldier – one
showing the soldier happily spending time with his family before joining the army
and the other showing the same soldier bayoneting Chinese people with ferocious
looks during the wars, the textbook is attempting to lead students to think about the
great harm and calamities caused by wars.63 In so doing, the descriptions of wars
and Japan’s atrocities in Chinese history textbooks aim to teach Chinese students that
war is cruel, that the civilians massacred in war are blameless, that life should be
cherished, and peace for humankind treasured, but never hatred or anti-sentiments
towards Japan and any other country (Li 2011: 144).
Coming to the classes in schools, under the new history curriculum with a goal
of having “emotional and value-based” and “quality-oriented” education, history
teachers have tried to introduce different aspects of Japan to students with
comprehensive information. According to the teachers I interviewed in Nanjing,
although they sometimes feel tensions between cultivating students’ patriotic
sentiments and their respect for traditions and culture of Japan when coming to
discuss some relevant issues, such as the origin of Japanese militarism and Yasukuni
Shrine, they always try to teach students to examine different aspects of the issues
and understand the issues from different perspectives and with respect and
appreciations.64
Following the instructions of HCS, history teachers have also tried different
ways to teach students about the historical events. In Nanjing, for example, as
suggested by one secondary school teacher I interviewed in the Memorial Hall of
The Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders, most of the history teachers
63
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PEP (2008), Lishi [History], P. 76.
Author’ s interview with secondary school teachers in Nanjing on Jan.10, 2011.
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in schools organize different extra-curricular activities, such as visiting the museum
and memorial hall and the living victims, watching documentaries or movies and so
forth, to allow the material to resonate with students and give them a better
opportunity to understand the Nanjing Massacre and Japan’s invasions in China as
well as other wartime history. While in Shenzhen where there are not historical relics
or relevant museums, history teachers, however, have to rely more on the Internet,
documentaries, movies and TV programs, and other forms of media, to teach
students about the wartime history. Added by one history teacher from a junior
secondary school in Shenzhen,
“Since many students are very interested in Japanese cartoons, one of my
colleagues who is very good at drawing, has tried to use cartoons to teach his
students the historical events. It works very well in helping students learn about
Japan as well as the wartime history.”65
In all, when the goal of cultivating both students’ patriotism and open-world
view is pursued, the new history curriculum intends to teach student a more
comprehensive view of Japan. With more liberal resources for updated information
about different aspects of Japan and the popularity of Japanese products and cultures
across China nowadays, teachers in history classes in schools, who are the mediators
between the intended and implemented curriculum, have to give students more
comprehensive information about Japan based on their own experience and
understanding of Japan and the curriculum through their own innovative approaches.

3.6 Conclusion
With the perceived challenges for both the CCP and Chinese society after the
Tiananmen Incident in 1989, China’s leaders have put many efforts into
strengthening and reforming their ideological-political education through promoting
a patriotic history curriculum in schools. In this patriotic history curriculum, the
history of modern and contemporary China has been emphasized as an important
source for patriotic education while the War of Resistance against Japan has been
highlighted and Japanese atrocities have been detailed. Nonetheless, from both the
official documents and different editions of history textbooks in 1980s and 1990s, it
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Author’s interview with secondary school teachers in Shenzhen on April 11, 2011.
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is noted that Chinese patriotic history curriculum has focused more on Chinese
heroic and adamant resistance against the invasion from Japan rather than purposely
maligning Japan. It is also noticeable that the descriptions of Japanese atrocities in
different editions of the history textbooks had been consistent even though they were
negative. Coming to the new century, under a nationwide history curriculum reform
in China, which aims at cultivating students a more balanced patriotic sentiments and
an open world-view, a more comprehensive view of Japan has been taught through
various ways in the history classes in secondary schools.
Based on these empirical findings through comparative and content analysis, I
thus come to conclude that the patriotic history education since 1978 in China has
not been infused with an intended stress on Japan-related or anti-Japanese context as
often assumed. By its content in both official and implemented levels, the patriotic
history education in China has been aimed at and committed to teaching Chinese
youths to be patriotic through its conventional hero folktale with such functional
units as endurance, struggles and ultimate victory (Hamada 2003:109), but not
through exaggerating Japan’s atrocities in modern China or purposely maligning
Japan.
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Chapter 4
Students’ Reactions to the Patriotic Education and Their
Perceptions of Japan
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter empirically studies the “creator”— Chinese patriotic
education before and after 1989 in both official and school levels. It particularly
examines the history narrative of Japan in patriotic history curriculum in Chinese
secondary school and shows how and what teachers teach students about Japan in the
history classes. This chapter, on the other way around, focuses on the “receiver” –
Chinese youths, and their reactions to the patriotic history curriculum in schools.
Relying on survey results as well as content analysis on relevant textual
materials, this chapter starts by discussing how Chinese youths perceive Japan and
what their understandings of Japan and Sino-Japanese relations are. It then comes to
address the focus of this Chapter: how do Chinese youths react to the patriotic
education curriculum in schools? Based on these discussions, this chapter finally
goes back to answer the main research question of this study: What effects does
patriotic education have on Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan?
4.2 Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan
As mentioned before, public opinion polls conducted by both Chinese and
Japanese organizations since the late-1980s have shown that Chinese in general
harbor consistently negative attitudes towards Japan, especially since the mid-1990s
(Kobayashi 2008: 89). Yet, having grown up in a more open Chinese society with all
kinds of Japanese products as well as influences from Japanese modern cultures,
what attitudes do Chinese youths nowadays have towards Japan? Although Chinese
youths have been indeed largely involved in the frequent anti-Japanese
demonstrations across mainland China in the last two decades, we have
simultaneously witnessed an overwhelming popularity of Japanese products and
modern Japanese culture among Chinese youths while the economic and cultural
exchanges between two sides have been greatly boosted.
Based on the empirical data from my survey with 643 secondary school students
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in 8 mainland cities and recent surveys conducted with college students and Chinese
populace in general by both independent scholars and research institutes, I thus
firstly try to obtain a more genuine picture of Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan
nowadays.

4.2.1 Multi-faceted rather than Simplistic
Most previous studies have commonly analyzed Chinese attitudes toward Japan
in a dichotomous manner and particularly focused on the increase/decrease of either
the negative or positive attitudes Chinese have towards Japan. From my survey with
secondary school students, however, I find out a majority of “moderate” attitudes
towards Japan among students (see Figure 4.1), which suggests that the majority of
the students hold neither negative nor positive views of Japan.
Figure 4.1. Students’ general perceptions of Japan66 (N＊=640)
Degree

Value

Very Unfavorable
1

6.1

2

3.8
12.3

Unfavorable
3

6.1

4

6.2
52.2

Moderate
5

25.0

6

27.2
20.4

Favorable
7

10.6

8

9.8

Very Favorable

4.7

9

2.2

10

2.5

Not sure
＊
Notes: N is the valid cases in total.

66

Percent (%)
9.9

0.5

A 10-point scale (ranging from very favorable to very unfavorable) was offered for students to
indicate their level of favorable/unfavorable attitudes towards Japan by a number between 10~1 (10
and 1 included). Since values in this 10-point scale are continuous and higher values are for more
favorable attitudes, for the purpose of data analysis, we equally divided ten points into five categories
– very favorable (10~9), favorable (8~7), moderate (6~5), unfavorable (4~3) and very unfavorable
(2~1). (See Figure 4.1)
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Surprising as this result seems to be, it is nonetheless not new. A majority of
moderate attitudes were also found in a regional survey conducted amongst Chinese
youths by the Institute of Japanese Studies of CASS in 2008.67 Many of the previous
public opinion polls on the general Chinese populace since 1988 in fact had a
majority or quite a large number of respondents demonstrating moderate attitudes
towards Japan as well (See Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.2. Moderate Attitudes in the Previous Public Opinion Polls since 198868
NO.

Time

Organizer

Moderate Attitudes (%)

1

Oct-10

Insight China

43.0

2

Oct-08

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)

31.2

3

Apr-07

Oriental Outlook

40.4

4

Sep-06

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)

37.5

5

Aug-06

China Daily and Genron NPO (Japan)

51.5

7

Aug-05

46.8

8

Aug-05

China Daily and Genron NPO (Japan)
Globe ．Sina.com

10

Dec-04

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)

53.6

11

Dec-02

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)

43.3

12

Sep-02

Asahi Shimbun

35.0

14

Sep-97

Asahi Shimbun

51.0

15

Jun-97

Asahi Shimbun

35.0

16

Feb-97

China Youth Daily

43.9

17

Jan-96

Fudan University

48.9

18

Dec-92

China National Situation Resaerch Association (CNSRA)

31.0

19

Dec-88

Jilin University

35.0

43.6

Methodologically speaking, reasons for respondents to hold moderate attitudes
vary and as Bailey (1987:133-134) suggested, sensitivity of the research topic may
cause respondents to be reluctant to expose their positions. It is indeed possible that
respondents in my survey avoid expressing their favorable or unfavorable attitudes
towards Japan due to the potential political sensitivity of the research topic under
certain circumstances. Nevertheless, a majority of moderate attitudes towards Japan
among secondary school students in my survey may imply that instead of seeing
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The survey was conducted with 591 secondary school students and college students from Beijing,
Shanghai and Hohhot (the capital city of Inner Mongolia). 55.0% of the 591 students held moderate
attitudes to Japan. See Zhang (2009).
68
For the public opinion poll conducted in 2010 by Insight China, see
http://news.cntv.cn/china/20101108/104125.shtml; for the one conducted by CASS in 2008, see the
Japanese Studies Institute of CASS (2009); for the others, see Kobayashi (2008).
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Japan in a dichotomous way, Chinese secondary school students may perceive Japan
from with both positive and negative orientations and have multi-faceted perceptions
of Japan.
Chinese youths’ multi-faceted perceptions of Japan have also been pointed out
and discussed in more recent surveys particularly done with Chinese college students.
In Sha’s survey with 410 college students from Xiamen University in 2008, for
example, Sha (2010: 3) found out that college students’ attitudes toward Japan varied
from Japanese culture, people and government. When Sha asked students to describe
their perceptions of Japan with two words (including nouns, adjectives, names of
people, etc.), Sha finally obtained as many as 8.18% neutral adjectives, of the 550
words provided by students (Sha 2010: 4).
Sha’s survey results somehow coincide with my survey result. As shown by
Figure 4.3, when students were asked about their views on different characteristics of
Japanese people, it turned out that most of the students surveyed agreed with both
positive and negative statements about Japanese. They on the one hand thought that
the Japanese are polite, responsible and discipline, but on the other hand, took the
Japanese impenitent, arrogant and aggressive.
Figure 4.3. Views on Different Characteristics of Japanese69

Japanese are polite

Strongly
Agree
/Agree (%)
66.9

Neutral
(%)
22.7

Strongly
Disagree
/Disagree (%)
8.5
5.9

Not
Sure
(%)
1.9
2.3

Total
(%)
＊

100 (N =643)

Japanese are responsible

70.8

21.0

100 (N=643)

Japanese are disciplined

69.1

20.0

8.2

2.7

100 (N=641)

Japanese are impenitent

45.6

32.0

18.0

4.4

100 (N=641)

Japanese are arrogant

48.5

30.7

17.1

3.7

100 (N=641)

Japanese are aggressive

68.6

20.6

8.3

2.5

100 (N=641)

Notes: ＊N is the valid cases in total. Percentages in the table are valid percents.
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Students were provided a five-point statement (5-1) ranging from strongly agree to strongly
disagree to measure their agreements with the six items describing both positive and negative
characteristics of Japanese people in the questionnaire. For the purpose of analysis, however,
“strongly agree” and “agree” are combined as a group while “strongly disagree” and “agree” are
combined as another group. For original data, see Survey Result in Appendix II
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Students’ multi-faceted understanding of Japan was further confirmed in my
in-depth interviews with 10 secondary school students from Shenzhen and Nanjing.
When students were individually interviewed and asked about their general
perceptions of Japan, almost all of the 10 students, however, answered that Japanese
are both “good” (hao) and “bad” (huai). Although different students gave different
reasons for Japanese being “good” and “bad”, in general, students hold negative
perceptions of Japanese because they thought that Japanese militarists who once
invaded China were cruel and aggressive, while the current Japanese [people] who
do not truly reflect on and even attempt to whitewash the war crimes that their
ancestors committed during the wartime are arrogant and impenitent. On the other
hand, however, they were impressed by Japanese politeness and self-discipline. All
the 10 students appreciated the good quality of Japanese products very much. Some
of them expressed their great fancy for Japanese cartoons and movies. Typically, four
senior high school students attributed the good quality of Japanese products and the
post-war economy miracle in Japan to the diligent Japanese people but blamed
Japanese militarists for their brutal invasion in China and other Asian countries.
Chen Shengluo’s in-depth interviews with college students in Beijing, Fujian
and Henan in 2001 revealed similar results.

College students, as he concluded,

clearly indicated their appreciations of certain Japanese national spirits, high
technology and modern culture, even though their general perceptions of Japan
tended to be negative (Chen 2003: 24).
Based on all these survey data, it is obvious that Chinese students’ perceptions
of Japan are not as simplistic as they are usually assumed and widely believed.
Chinese students, who are overall more liberal and better informed nowadays,
actually perceive Japan from multiple perspectives and have multi-faceted rather
than dichotomous perceptions of Japan.

4.2.2 More rational than nationalistic
Chinese youths’ multi-faceted views of Japan can be further proved by their
rational views on Japan and the controversial issues between China and Japan. By
“rational”, here I try to suggest, as is also supported by the survey data below, that
Chinese youths tend to adopt an approach with more liberal and pragmatic rationality
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but less subjective and emotional nationalism to understand Japan and Sino-Japanese
relations. In other words, although it is inevitable for Chinese students to posses and
demonstrate certain levels of nationalist sentiments when looking at Japan, which is
one of several foreign countries invading China, Chinese students nowadays manage
to perceive Japan in a more liberal, reasonable and pragmatic way.
My surveys firstly found a more liberal understanding of the controversial
issues between China and Japan among the students surveyed. As Figure 4.4
indicates, when asked about their views on wartime history and the current disputes
between China and Japan,70 less than half of the students strongly disliked the issue
concerning Japanese prime ministers’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine, while a majority of
the students hold the same views on the issues regarding wartime history, textbook
disputes, and territorial disputes. Accordingly, there are relatively more students not
against Japanese prime ministers’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine than students not against
the other disputes. (As highlighted in Figure 4.4)
Similar results are also found in students’ responses to the question of whether
they would demonstrate against Japan due to the disputes between China and Japan.71
(See Figure 4.5)

70

To measure this dimension, students were asked: To what extent, if any, do you dislike the
following issues: 1) Japanese aggression in China during wartime; 2) Japanese right-wingers’ revisions
of history textbooks; 3) Japanese prime ministers’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine; 4) Japan’s competition
with China over the sovereignty of Diaoyu/Senkaku Island and East China Sea? 5) strongly dislike, 4)
dislike, 3) somewhat dislike, 2) not dislike, 1) not dislike at all, and 0) not sure. The listed disputes
obviously do not cover all bilateral disputes between China and Japan. The dispute over Japan’s
“apology”, for example, is not included in the scale. However, these disputes chosen the disputes most
frequently mentioned by students when they answered my open-ended questions about their
knowledge about the bilateral disputes between China and Japan in the pre-tests.
71
Since wartime history has been past, it is inappropriate to ask students whether they will
demonstrate due to Japanese aggression in China during wartime. Therefore, student were asked:
Given permissions to demonstrate in China, please tell us if you will: 1) attend, or 2) not attend the
legal demonstrations against Japan for the following issues between China and Japan: 1) Japanese
right-wingers’ revision of history textbooks; 2) Japanese prime ministers’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine; 3)
Japan’s competition with China over the sovereignty of Diaoyu/Senkaku Island and East China Sea.
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Figure 4.4.

Views on Controversial Issues between China and Japan
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Figure 4.5.
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Notes: ＊N is the valid cases in total. Percentages in the table are valid percents.

Why are there relatively fewer students against and willing to demonstrate
against Japan for Japanese prime ministers’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine? Based on my
content analysis on students’ answers to the open questions which asked students to
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explain reasons for their options in the questionnaire, the biggest reason cited by the
students, who chose not to against Japan due to Japanese prime ministers’ visits to
the Yasukuni Shrine, is that “Japanese prime ministers’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine are
personal behaviors and domestic issues within Japan, and thus should not be
intervened in by foreigners.”72
Japanese prime ministers’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine have been commonly taken
as one of the major disputes bothering Sino-Japanese relations and the main reason
for the “cold” political relations between Chinese and Japanese governments
between 2001 and 2005 (Liu 2007; Wan 2006). While the Chinese government
usually criticizes Japanese prime ministers’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine as a serious
offense which harms the feelings of Chinese and other Asian countries, Chinese
students seem less critical on this issue and would take it as Japan’s domestic affair.
This clearly reveals certain levels of disparity between the Chinese official narrative
and students’ understanding of the issue.
The fact that recent Japanese prime ministers have avoided actually visiting
Yasukuni Shrine may also contribute to the easing of Chinese students’ criticisms on
this dispute. Nonetheless, students’ liberal understanding of Japanese prime
ministers’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine is possible in today’s situation when Chinese
students are better informed and have a more liberal and comprehensive
understanding of Japan. Without direct experiences of the war and occupation but
living in a relatively more open Chinese society, as Figure 4.6 shows, students
nowadays generally know about the different aspects of Japan and Sino-Japanese
relations, though the extent to which they know about different aspects varies. It is
thus not groundless to argue that Chinese students nowadays tend to have more
comprehensive knowledge about Japan and understand Sino-Japanese relations in a
more liberal way. This also makes it possible for Chinese students to perceive Japan
with less subjectivity and emotional nationalism, but with more reasonable
considerations and pragmatic rationality.

72

For further analysis, I asked respondents to give reasons for their decisions. Two biggest reasons
suggested by respondents who decided not to demonstrate against in terms of Japanese prime
ministers’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine are “It is the freedom of Japanese prime ministers” and “It is the
domestic issues of Japan”.
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Figure 4.6.

How much do you know about Japan and Sino-Japanese
relations?73
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100 (N=643)

94.0
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72.1

27.9
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92. 4

7.6
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Notes: ＊N is the valid cases in total. Percentages in the table are valid percents.

As figure 4.6 shows, Chinese students nowadays are very much impressed by
Japanese products and modern culture (92.4%). This result seems contradictory to
the fact that Chinese students from time to time raise high a slogan of “boycotting
Japanese products” to go against Japanese governments for their misdeeds to China.
One thus may question whether Chinese students really boycott Japanese products in
their daily life, or, it is just a nationalistic slogan.
A recent survey particularly undertaken with the Chinese youths in Beijing,
Shanghai and Hohhot has shed light on this question. It showed that as a matter of
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A five-point statement was offered to measure the extent students know about the listed aspects
about Japan and Sino-Japanese relations, ranging from “know very well” (5) to “not know at all”(1).
For the purpose of analysis, “know very well”, “know” and “somewhat know” were added up together
as one group, while “know little” and “not know at all” were added up as the other. For original data,
see Survey Results in Appendix II
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fact, the majority of the Chinese youths would rather make a rational choice between
Japanese products and other products based on the price and quality than emotionally
boycotting Japanese products for political reasons. 74 With an overwhelming
popularity of Japanese products, fashion and popular cultures among Chinese youths
and the increasing economic and cultural exchanges between two countries, it is
more evident that Chinese youths in fact tend to have a rational calculation instead of
being emotionally nationalistic when coming to decide what product to buy.
Chinese youths’ rational views of Japan could also be implied in their pragmatic
efforts to divide Japanese society into different sectors and treat the different sectors
according to the extent of the damages which these different sectors have given or
might give to China. As Sha found out in her survey, college students’ positive
attitudes toward Japanese culture, Japanese people and Japanese governments
successively decreased as the possibility that these three sectors might bring harms to
China successively increase (Sha 2010:3).
From my own survey with secondary school students, it is also noticeable that
students held different attitudes towards the Japanese military and Japanese people.
In a scale for measuring students’ views towards different issues after their visits to
the patriotic education bases concerning Japanese invasion in modern China, 89.0%
of the students in total strongly agree and agree that Japanese militarists were cruel,
while only 47.6% of the students strongly agree and agree that Chinese should hate
Japanese (As highlighted in Figure 4.7). There are also as many as 62.9% of the
students strongly agree and agree that both Chinese and Japanese people were
victims of the wars (See Figure 4.7).

74

66.3% of the respondents held this point of view toward Japanese products while only 6.8% of the
respondents said they will never buy a Japanese product. See Zhang (2009:143).
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Figure 4.7. Attitudes towards Chinese, Japanese and wartime history after
participating in the extra-curricular activities75
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Notes: ＊N is the valid cases in total. Percentages in the table are valid percents

Moreover, as the Chinese older generations do, Chinese youths nowadays also
try to distinguish the majority of Japanese people from the small batch of Japanese
right-wingers. One student who I had in-depth interviews with, for example,
seriously blamed the Japanese right-wingers for their efforts to revise the Japanese
history textbooks and “whitewash” the historical facts, but believed that the revised
textbooks were not widely accepted by most of the Japanese people.
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In the scale for measuring students’ views towards different issues after their
visits to the patriotic education bases, again, there are totally 75.9% of the students
who strongly agree and agree with Chinese official approach to take history as
guidance and look into the future. There are also as many as 92.2% of the students
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Students were posed a question of “Do you agree with the following statements after watching
movies/documentaries and visiting museums/memorial halls pertaining to Japanese aggression in
China during wartime?” and a five-point statement to measure the extent to which they agree with the
listed statements. The five-point statement ranges from “strongly agree” (5) to “strongly disagree” (1).
For the purpose of data analysis, “strongly agree” and “agree” were added up together as one group
while “strongly disagree” and “disagree” were added up as the other. For original data, see Survey
Results in Appendix II.
76
Author’s interview with a senior high student from Shenzhen in April 2, 2011.
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who strongly agree and agree to cherish world peace and go against the wars (See
Figure 4.7).
From the aforementioned survey results on students’ attitudes towards the
different disputes between China and Japan and the wartime history, although
students seem more radical regarding the historical disputes and territorial disputes, it
does not necessarily mean that students hold exclusively nationalistic attitudes
towards Japan. Students’ strong support for a peaceful and far-sighted approach to
deal with the historical disputes and a truly love for world peace further proved that
Chinese youths are by no means adopting exclusive nationalism towards Japan.
Rather, they tend to look at Japan and deal with disputes between China and Japan in
a more rational manner. As both Chinese and Japanese scholars believe, Chinese
youths, though embedded with a collective memory of historical traumas in the
“humiliated century”, somehow manage to deal with the bilateral disputes rationally
(Chen 2003, Sha 2008, Suzuki 2007).
4.3 Students’ reactions to patriotic history curriculum
Having examined the history narrative of Japan in Chinese patriotic education
(“creator”) in the previous chapter and the perceptions of Japan among Chinese
youths (“receivers”) above, it is still hard to conclude the effects of Chinese patriotic
education on Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan based on the assumption of
“creator-receiver connections.” It is obvious that Chinese youths’ perceptions of
Japan do not perfectly fit with the official narrative of Japan in the patriotic history
curriculum though a more comprehensive view of Japan has been introduced in
recent history classes and Chinese youths nowadays indeed tend to have
multi-faceted perceptions of Japan.
While schools have been widely taken as one of most controllable and thus
effective socialization agents, as aforementioned, the theory of political socialization
also stresses the important role of students, who are the “receivers” of the schooling,
in deciding the effectiveness of school education, and admits the possibility of
students’ resistance to the political messages embedded within the curriculum.
Therefore, the causal linkages, if there are any, between the patriotic education
curriculum in schools and students’ perceptions of Japan, are actually not that
straightforward. It, however, has to go through students’ reception and “digestion” of
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the messages from the patriotic education curriculum in schools. Whether and how
students actually take in the history narrative of Japan in the patriotic education
curriculum should largely depend on students’ reactions to the curriculum.
How do Chinese students, then, react to the patriotic history curriculum in
schools? Do they receive or resist the history narrative of Japan in the patriotic
curriculum? To what extent do they “digest” those messages received? To address
these questions, I thus posed two questions to the students surveyed to inquire about
their views towards what has been taught about Japan in schools and the consistency
between the narratives of Japan in schools and the ones from sources out of schools.
Students were firstly asked, “Which have you been taught about the most in
your classes: the positive aspects of Japan or negative ones?” According to students’
responses to the question, the majority of the students (67.5%) chose “both”, which
suggests that students have learned equally positive and negative messages about
Japan (See Figure 4.8). This result somehow matches with the aforementioned fact in
the previous chapter that the reformed history curriculum since 2001 has introduced
a more comprehensive and balanced view of Japan, even though other 22.2% of the
students thought that what has been taught about Japan in schools is more negative
than positive, which is more than the students thinking in the opposite way (8%) (See
Figure 4.8). This result therefore reveals that Chinese students to some extent receive
the information about Japan provided by the schools, and that the information
received, if there is any, covers both positive and negative aspects of Japan while the
negative are more than the positive.
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In the questionnaire, I successively asked students, “Do you think what you
have learned about Japan in schools is consistent with what you have learned about
Japan out of schools?” Based on students’ responses, again, I find out a majority of
students holding moderate attitudes (61.0%), which suggests that most students
thought that some of the contents about Japan in school curricula are consistent with
the information about Japan outside of schools while some are not (See Figure 4.9).
Except for this majority of “moderate attitudes”, however, there were 32.2% students
thinking that the narrative of Japan in schools is consistent with the ones out of
schools while only 3.3% of students thought in the opposite way (See Figure 4.9).

Additionally, based on students’ responses to the question pertaining to the
effects of textbooks and teachers on their perceptions of Japan, it is shown that more
students did not think that their perceptions of Japan were changed by the both
textbooks and teachers (respectively 43.1% and 47.4%, as highlighted in Figure 4.10).
According to the aforementioned explanation of redundancy in chapter I, these
results in all imply the possibility that students may compromise their receptions of
the information from schools since what has been taught about Japan in schools may
be just a repetition of the information from other resources out of schools.
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Figure 4.10 How did your perceptions of Japan change due textbooks /
teachers?
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Teachers

Worsened
(%)

Remained
the same (%)

Improved
(%)

Not Sure
(%)

35.0

43.1

17.4

4.5
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＊
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4.4

100

24.0

47.4

24.2

Total
(%)

(N=633)
Notes: ＊N is the valid cases in total. Percentages in the table are valid percents.

Furthermore, as shown by Figure 4.11, most of the students nowadays took the
Internet and other mass media as their most important source of information about
Japan (69.1%) while far fewer students thought school education are most important
for them to learn about Japan (21.9%). This also proved that schools are not the most
important information sources for the most students to learn about Japan. It is thus
evident that students’ reception of schools’ narrative of Japan is limited, even though
students do receive information about Japan from schools to certain extent and the
information within schools has more consistency than inconsistency with the ones
out of schools.
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From Figure 4.9, it is also found that the effects of textbooks and teachers on
students’ perceptions of Japan, if there are any, are contradictory. This finding is
more important in the sense that it reveals teachers’ resistance to the intended history
curriculum as well. According to Grioux (Giroux and Purpel, et al. 1983: 349),
neither students nor teachers resemble the “social puppets” and both teachers and
students demonstrate forms of resistance to the “hegemonic” contexts in the intended
curriculum. Teachers’ resistance to the intended curriculum will counteract the
effects of textbooks. It thus may again hinder students’ receptions and “digestion” of
the intended curriculum and strengthen students’ resistance to the intended
curriculum.
According to my interviews with history teachers in both Nanjing and Shenzhen,
parts of which have been revealed in chapter III, teachers do have their own
interpretation of the history and they could actually teach students their own
understanding of the history in classes although they have to strictly follow the
official curriculum and teaching guideline by principle and constrained by all kinds
of competitive examinations for students in China. With the reformed history
curriculum, history teachers have tried their own ways to teach students a more
comprehensive view of Japan, especially when they find tensions between cultivating
students’ patriotic sentiments and teaching students broader knowledge about Japan.
Being better informed and with more liberal mind-sets, Chinese students
nowadays, though they have to pragmatically deal with the coursework in schools
due to the pressure from examinations and may not well receive and “digest” the
history curriculum due to the reasons of redundancy, teachers, etc., also tend to be
more political-ideological independent and thus more skeptical towards the political
messages embedded in the hidden curriculum in schools. Students’ unofficial
thinking of Japanese PMs’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, as aforementioned, not only
shows students’ rational perceptions of Japan, but also shows students’ resistance to
the official narrative of Japan in school history curriculum, especially the negative
narrative of Japan, which tends to contradict students’ own images of Japan based on
their own experience and information from other more liberal sources. This explains
the disparity between the intended official narrative and students’ actual
understandings of Japan.
In sum, by examining Chinese students’ reactions to the patriotic history
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curriculum in secondary schools using the survey data, it is found that although
students receive the information about Japan from schools to certain extent, students
do not well “digest” the information received and tend to resist the negative narrative
of Japan, which is suspected to be embedded with political-ideological propaganda
or national myth making messages.
4.4 The effects of patriotic education on students’ perceptions of Japan
As shown above, the empirical findings of this study so far do not support the
assumption of “creator-receiver connections,” but reveal that students’ reactions to
the patriotic history curriculum do matter in deciding the effects of Chinese patriotic
education and the Chinese patriotic education tends to have relatively weak effects
on Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan.

4.4.1 A less important role compared to mass media
Previous surveys have consistently asked Chinese respondents their sources of
information about Japan. With the developments of technology and more alternatives
for communication, the sources for Chinese to learn about Japan change over time.
For the purpose of this study, I asked students about their views on different possible
sources as well. As discussed earlier and shown by Figure 4. 11, the majority of the
students (69.1%) chose Internet, TV programs and other mass media as the most
important sources for them to learn about Japan, while only 21.9% of the students
selected school education, followed by experience of families, relatives, friends
(2.6%) and personal experiences (1.9%).
This result is not surprising in today’s context. It is consistent with the results
from the nationwide public opinion polls jointly conducted by China Daily and the
Japanese Genron NPO since 2005 as well as the ones conducted by the Institute of
Japan Studies of CASS since 2002.77 In general, most of the Chinese populace
nowadays indeed learns major information about Japan from different kinds of mass
media rather than other sources and this is just more obvious among Chinese students

77

For results of the 6 surveys of China Daily and Japanese Genron NPO from 2005 to 2010, see
http://tokyo-beijingforum.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=section&layout=blog&id=17&It
emid=159;
For
results
of
the
most
recent
survey
in
2011,
see
http://www.genron-npo.net/pdf/forum2011.pdf. For results of surveys conducted by Institute of Japan
Studies of CASS, see Institute of Japan Studies (2002, 2004, 2006) and Wang (2009).
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today.78
It is not the intention of this study to make comparisons among the effects of
different sources in influencing students’ perceptions of Japan. However,
comparisons among the roles of different sources are helpful to “locate” the role of
school education as a source of information about Japan in a broad sense. By
comparisons, it seems obvious that the Internet and other mass media are playing
much bigger roles than schools in providing students’ information about Japan. It is
also implied, as aforementioned, that students may tend to compromise their
receptions of messages from schools rather than the ones from the Internet and other
mass media if these two messages meet conflicts or redundancies. This well explains
why more consistency between information inside and outside of schools could not
necessarily lead to students’ stronger receptions of the information from schools, and
further confirms the relatively less important role of patriotic education in schools at
least as a source for information about Japan when compared to the Internet and
other mass media.

4.4.2 Not as effective as it is assumed
According to the Outline on the Implementation of Patriotic Education, which
was issued by the Chinese Communist Party in 1994, patriotic education in schools is
implemented mainly through the following three approaches: textbooks, teachers and
extra-curricular activities (Chinese Communist Party Central Committee 1994). To
fully examine of the effects of patriotic education, I thus inquire the effects of all
three dimension respectively.
Students then were asked to evaluate the direct impacts of these approaches on
their perceptions of Japan in my survey. As is highlighted in Figure 4.10 above,
nearly half of the students suggest that their perceptions of Japan remain the same. In
other words, their perceptions of Japan were not changed by both the textbooks and
teachers in classes.
In reality, “remain the same” could be understood in two ways. First, as
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Due to the bigger popularity of Internet among younger people, it is reasonable to assume that
among all the mass media, it may be the Internet that plays a relatively bigger role in influencing
Chinese youth’s perceptions of Japan. But this is not the focus of this study. I thus put the Internet
together with the other mass media so as to compare with the role of school education.
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discussed earlier, students may resist the information from textbooks and teachers,
and thus their perceptions of Japan are not affected by both the textbooks and
teachers at all. Second, students may well receive information about Japan from their
classes, but the information they received from school classes is the same as the
information they received from sources outside of the schools, therefore their
perceptions of Japan remain the same.
Both of these two situations exist among students I had in-depth interviews with.
Some students said that they did not learn that much information about Japan from
classes, but received information mainly through the Internet and newspapers, and
thus their perceptions of Japan were not affected by either the textbooks or teachers
in classes; some students, however, suggested that they had indeed learnt different
aspects about Japan from classes, but what they had learnt from classes was almost
the same as what they had known about Japan from their families, newspapers and
the Internet, where they learned major information about Japan, and thus textbooks
and teachers in classes do not really change their perceptions of Japan.79
In either way, it is clear that the effects of textbooks and teachers do not work
out independently, but have to interact with the effects of other sources and are
largely constrained by the effects of other sources. Moreover, as discussed before,
from Figure 4.10 we also see that the effects of textbooks and teachers on students’
perceptions of Japan themselves tend to contradict with each other. This suggests that
the effects from textbooks and teachers will counteract with each other and both two
factors consequently could not be as effective as is usually assumed.
4.4.3 Effective as patriotic education but not as “anti-Japanese” education
What about, then, the effects of the curriculum through extra-curricular
activities? Could the patriotic education through extra-curricular activities make a
difference in influencing students’ perceptions of Japan?
As mentioned in chapter III, the CCP outline and other educational regulations
for implementation on patriotic education have called upon all social sectors,
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Students holding the first point of views are 2 senior high students from Shenzhen. They are both
majoring in physics and thus may pay less attention to the history classes. Students holding the second
point of views are 4 students from Nanjing. Students in Nanjing, as Li and Shi’ s survey with 1000
college students in Nanjing revealed, know more about Nanjing massacre and other historical events
concerning Japan’s invasion in modern China than students from other cities. See Li and Shi (2005).
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especially primary and secondary schools, to create a lively atmosphere of patriotism.
Thus, a plethora of extracurricular activities have been carried out in primary and
secondary schools in China. Among those activities, watching documentaries and
movies related to wartime history and visiting patriotic education bases (which are
usually museums and memorial halls) concerning Japan’s invasion in modern China
are two major and important ones which are supposed to provoke students’
anti-Japanese sentiments towards Japan. To examine the effects of schooling through
those extra-curricular activities, I thus asked students about their participations in
these extra-curriculum activities. As Figure 4.12 shows, most of students have
watched movies or documentaries relevant to Japan’s invasion in modern China
(72.4%), while nearly half of the students said that they have pay site visits to those
patriotic education bases pertaining to Japan’s aggression in China (40.4%). This
suggests that students to some degree do participate in these school-organized
activities, though students’ participations in site visits are generally lower than their
participations in watching movies and documentaries.80

Figure 4. 12. Have you joined the following extra-curricular activities organized
by schools?
1. Watching movies, TV programs or
documentaries relevant to Japanese
aggressions in modern China

Yes (%)

No (%)

Total (%)

72.4

27.6

100 (N =642)

＊

2. Visiting patriotic education bases
40.4
59.6
100 (N=634)
pertaining to Japanese aggressions in
modern China
Notes: ＊N is the valid cases in total. Percentages in the table are valid percents.

Having participating in those extra-curricular activities, what patriotic lessons
have students learnt? As was discussed earlier, a scale was further posed to measure
students’ attitudes towards Chinese, Japanese and the wartime history. According to
Figure 4.7, Chinese students, though agreed that Japanese militaries are cruel (89%),
they did not really think that Chinese should hate Japanese (46.7%, as highlighted in
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Students’ participations in site visits depend on the historical background of the cities. Much more
of the students from Nanjing and Shenyang have participated in site visits since Nanjing and
Shenyang are two cities with more patriotic education bases related to Japan. See Survey Results in
Appendix II.
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Figure 4.7). Most of them, however, would rather like to take Chinese and Japanese
people as both victims of the wars (62.9%). Chinese students were definitely
patriotic in the sense that most of them felt deeply empathetic to their Chinese
fellows who suffered from and died in the wars (84.8%) and responsible for reviving
Chinese nation (85.9%). Chinese students, however, would like to settle down the
historical disputes with Japan in a peaceful way and agreed to take history as
guidance and look into the future (75.9%). Moreover, Chinese students who voted
for a love for peace and a fight against wars ranked the highest (92.2%), which
clearly suggests that Chinese students nowadays do not bear narrow or radical
nationalism as it is usually assumed.
These survey results are further supported by my own visits to two of the largest
patriotic education bases -- the Museum of the War of Chinese People’s Resistance
Against Japanese Aggression located near Lugouqiao (Marco Polo Bridge) in Beijing
and the Memorial Hall of The Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders built
on the historical battlefields in Nanjing. In these two historical sites where strong
anti-Japanese sentiments are supposed to be provoked, I am surprised to find out that
there are actually more striking banners glorifying Chinese people’s great resistance
against the foreign invaders and calling for love for Chinese motherland and world
peace than anti-Japanese rhetoric. Both museums, as could be perceived from their
names, were certainly built for memorializing the traumatic wartime history. Thus,
important historical events are presented in details with words, vivid pictures and
different kinds of touching approaches in the museums. However, with the historical
details, the museums do not actually aim at provoking peoples’ hatred and
nationalistic feelings towards Japan. Rather, an emphasis on China’s triumph in
Sino-Japanese wars, a call for Chinese love for motherland and world peace, and the
official discourse, “taking the past as a guide for the future” (yishi weijian), are more
dominant, especially when it comes to in the conclusion part of the museums (See
Figure 4.13 ).
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Figure 4. 13. “Past experience, if not forgotten, is a guide for the future” (qianshi buwang, houshi
zhishi). Photo taken in the Museum of the War of Chinese People’s Resistance
Against Japanese Aggression in Beijing, January 5, 2011.
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Figure 4. 14. Visitor Comments in
Museum * and Hall *

37
24

17

Note:

“Museum”
means
Museum

the

Museum Hall
of the

War

of

Chinese

People’s

Resistance

Against Japanese Aggression; “Hall” means the Memorial Hall of The Victims in Nanjing Massacre
by Japanese Invaders.

Anti-Japanese
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Non Anti-Japanese

As a result, when examining the visitors’ comments in both museums,81 I also
surprisingly found out that there are more non anti-Japanese comments than
anti-Japanese comments in both museums (See Figure 4. 14). From the visitors’
comments collected, positive comments like “Keeping the national humiliation in
mind and reviving the Chinese nation” (wuwang guochi, zhenxin zhonghua) and
“Cherish the peace and fight against wars” (zhenai heping, fandui zhanzheng) are
more numerous than negative comments such as “All Japanese evils go to the hell”
(riben guizi sige jingguang) or “Little Japanese deserve one more nuclear bombing”
(gaigei xiaoriben laiduo yige yuanzidan). From the comments, it is clear that more
Chinese visitors tend to be sympathetic for their Chinese fellows who died in wars,
be patriotic to the Chinese motherland, and be appreciative of the present-day peace.
Not many of them really bear hatred towards Japan, especially towards Japanese
people. They would criticize, if they do, Japanese militarism, fascism, or the evil of
war as a whole.

4.5 Conclusion
Focusing on the “receivers” of Chinese patriotic education, this chapter mainly
examines Chinese students’ perceptions of Japan and their reactions to the patriotic
education through history textbooks and teachers as well as extra-curriculum
activities in secondary schools. Based on data from my surveys with secondary
schools students and other surveys with college students as well as general Chinese
populace, it is firstly found out that different from, if not contrary to, the
widely-accepted idea that Chinese youths are anti-Japanese, Chinese youths
nowadays in fact tend to perceive Japan in a multi-faceted and rational way. Having
grown up in a more open Chinese society with different sources of information about
Japan, Chinese youths are better informed and more politically and ideologically
independent. They thus have a more liberal understanding of Japan as well as the
patriotic education in schools. It is then found out that the reactions of the “receivers”
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Both museums allow visitors to leave comments on the museums as well as their personal feelings
after their visits. By collected the latest parts of the comments which were left by the most recent
visitors and were available for reference, I totally collected 61 pieces of comments from the Memorial
Hall of The Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders, and 126 pieces of comments from the
Museum of the War of Chinese People`s Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. Based on the
general ideas and the wordings of the comments, I further divide the comments into two categories –
“anti-Japanese” and “non anti-Japanese.”For the results of the content analysis, see Figure 4.14.
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do matter in deciding the effects of schooling, and due to the bigger influences from
the Internet and other mass media as well as the problems within the schooling
structure and actors (in this case, the “resistance” of the teachers and students to the
intended curriculum), Chinese patriotic education in schools seems to play a less
important and effective role in forming students’ perceptions of Japan, especially
their negative perceptions of Japan.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
5.1. A more genuine picture
The politics over the content of history textbooks has triggered the “memory
wars” between China and Japan since the early 1980s. Critics and public attentions
have for so long focused on history textbooks and the negative impacts of history
textbooks on both Chinese and Japanese people’s understanding of the wartime
history and the bilateral relations. This study, however, based on its empirical
examinations on Chinese textbook materials and secondary school students, has come
to suggest the weak effects of Chinese patriotic history education on Chinese youths’
perceptions of Japan.
In today’s China, which is characterized by new academic journals, gradually
more liberalized news media, rapid growth of Internet, and a more globalized,
developed and informed citizenry, it has been much more difficult for the state to
impose a single version of the nationalist truth (Zhao 2006). It is therefore no longer
possible for the party-state to cultivate Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan (or any
other countries) simply through its political-ideological education in schools as well.
While schools have been taken as one of the most controllable and important
socialization agent, the theory of totality suggested by Giroux (1983: 344) has pointed
out that schools do not exist in a political and social vacuum. Instead, “schools would
be analyzed, both historically and sociologically, in regard to their interconnections
with other economic and political institutions” (Giroux and Purpel, et al. 1983: 344).
The theory of totality also stresses the complex relationship between schools and the
dominant society as well as the active nature of resistance in human beings. It believes
that neither students nor teachers resemble the “social puppets” and both teachers and
students demonstrate forms of resistance to the “hegemonic” contexts in the intended
curriculum (Giroux and Purpel, et al. 1983: 349). In this way, to what extent the
intended curriculum is implemented and received actually depends on the interactions
among different socialization agents, the interconnections among different
components within each agent, and most importantly, students’ reactions to the
schooling.
76

This study, thus, by surveying the secondary school students from 8 Chinese
mainland cities about their reactions to the patriotic history schooling, has revealed
that in the case of contemporary China, Chinese youths nowadays, who are better
informed and with a more liberal mind-set, are no longer good followers and listeners
of the political-ideological curriculum in schools. Their understandings of Japan and
Sino-Japanese relations are not necessarily identical with the history narrative of
Japan presented in the school patriotic curriculum. They, instead, tend to resist the
message which is likely to be embedded with political-ideological indoctrination.
With stronger influences from the Internet and other mass media and the conflicting
effects of textbooks and teachers, Chinese youths in fact do not well “digest” the
information from schools.
Therefore, this study makes a strong case to scrutinize the acuities of “receivers”
in the analysis of school history education’s impact on peoples’ understanding of
history, rejecting the simplified assumptions of “creator-receiver connections” and
providing a more genuine picture of the formation process of Chinese youths’
perceptions of Japan and the mechanism on how Chinese patriotic education affects
the formation process (See below).
Textbooks

The
patriotic
history
education in
schools

Teachers
Extra-curricular activities

The Internet and
other mass media

Family education

Personal experience

Other socialization
agents, such as
contingent political
events, natural
disasters, etc.
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Chinese
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reactions to the
information about
Japan
and
Sino-Japanese
relations

Chinese
youths’
multi-faceted
and rational
perceptions of
Japan

5.2. “Confident nationalism”
Born in 1980s and 1990s when both economic and cultural exchanges have been
boosted between China and Japan, Chinese youths have grown up with access to all
kinds of Japanese products, fashions and popular cultures, although on the other hand
they have learned about Japanese invasions in modern China from schools and
witnessed the fluctuating Sino-Japanese relations with their own eyes in the past
decades. With such living experience, Chinese youths nowadays, as my survey results
have shown, tend to have multi-faceted rather than dichotomous perceptions of Japan.
As aforementioned, with more liberal mind-set and being better informed, Chinese
youths seem also more politically and ideologically independent and thus manage to
perceive the outside world, including Japan who was once the most brutal invader in
China during wartime, with more reasonable and pragmatic rationality but less
emotional and exclusionary nationalism.
In today’s China, which has been undergoing the Reform and Opening-up policy
with globalization for over 30 years, Chinese youths have also witnessed the rapid
growth and the great reform of Chinese society in the past few decades.

Although

they have been taught the history about the “humiliation century” in schools, they
have been living far away from wartime and instead being taught to cherish the peace
and be prepared for the globalization. Chinese youths, therefore, as some scholars
recently observe, tend to have more “confident nationalism.”82 It is also suggested that
the pre-existing Chinese “traumatic nationalism” which was rooted in its “national
humiliation” and supposed to be vengeful and exclusionary seems to be fading away,
or at least, is no longer that obvious among Chinese youths (Friedman 2010; Lewis
2010).
According to Daniel Bell (2008: 2), who has been teaching political theory at
Tsinghua University in Beijing and has a chance to closely observe Chinese youths,
“As China rises to great power status, it seems more obvious that Chinese patriotism
and nationalism, especially those among Chinese youths, tend to base their national
pride and confidence on China’s recent developments and Chinese traditional culture
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Michel Oksenbeg (1986) used “confident nationalism” to describe Chinese nationalism after Deng’s
Open and Reform policy in 1980s and characterized by openness to international ideas in the
economic sphere, confidence in the resiliency of Chinese culture and ongoing rhetorical opposition to
the West as the primary means of national identification. Also see Bell (2008).
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rather than the national traumas and the psychology of ‘being victimized’… Some
Chinese students nowadays become “nationalistic” in the sense of being committed to
learning more about Chinese culture and philosophy… In fact, Chinese students today
commonly believe that any stable and legitimate political arrangement needs to be
founded, at least partly, on political ideas from their own tradition.”
Despite the growing social and economic inequality and more widely known
official corruption in current Chinese society, many Chinese, not only Chinese youths,
seem quite confident in China’s further developments and the way in which China is
developing. Based on the Pew Research Center’s most recent global survey on
peoples’ outlook on the economy growth of their own countries, China is one of the
emerging economies where the people have more positive economic outlook of their
country and more trust in their economic model.83 Being aware of the complexity of
the domestic and international problems China is facing, Chinese youths today,
however, no longer think that there is “one catch-all solution” and even become
“apologists” for the government especially when “the ill-informed foreigners start to
bash their countries” (Bell 2008: 2).
With its economic success, social stability and gradual political reform in the
past three decades, the CCP government has indeed won widespread support from its
peoples (Lewis 2010, 10). Despite there have been critical voices rising up across the
nation through different approaches, and for long there have been both international
and domestic critics of the CCP government’s oppressions over the critical voices
within China, the CCP government so far has successfully avoided another massive
anti-government movements and won over the satisfaction and confidence from most
of Chinese public. In order to build up Chinese populace’s confidence and trust in its
ruling, the CCP government has in fact shifted its post-1989 “patriotic education
campaign” emphasizing the “humiliation century” to the new state propaganda
focusing on “great achievements under the Reform and Opening-up Policy of the
CCP.” (Lewis 2010)
Such a shift in official propaganda has been clearly seen from many aspects of
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See” Pervasive Gloom About the World Economy”, Pew Research Center, July 12, 2012,
http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/07/12/pervasive-gloom-about-the-world-economy/?utm_source=Perv
asive+Gloom+About+the+World+Economy&utm_campaign=Economic+Conditions&utm_medium=e
mail, firstly accessed on July 13, 2012.
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the recent changing Chinese society. First and foremost, the changes of the
ideological-political discourse in school curriculum, as revealed earlier in this study,
are obviously seen through the more balanced introductions and more equal
treatments to Chinese ancient, modern and contemporary history and world history in
the reformed history curriculum for secondary schools since 2001. These changes in
historical narratives – if they are not a coincidence – could be viewed as a sign of the
CCP government’s new efforts to build up people’s confidence in the party-state
through promoting their national pride based on the great achievements in the past
three decades, their national identity originated from Chinese traditional culture and
their balanced and peaceful view of the outside world.
Besides, it is clear that the evolving nature of Chinese state propaganda was best
seen in 2008, the year when the worst snowstorm in 50 years hit China in January,
followed by Tibetan unrest in March, 8.0-magnitude Sichuan Earthquake in May, the
Torch Relay through April to July, the Beijing Olympics in August and finally the
worldwide financial crisis starting in late-2008 (Barme 2009; Brady 2009). All these
“natural calamities and man-made misfortunes” (tianzai renhuo) as well as the great
success of the Beijing Olympics in 2008 have called upon Chinese national unity and
identity, raising high Chinese “confident nationalism” and building up a new source
for the legitimacy of the CCP’s authority.
The successfully holding major international events, such as the Beijing
Olympics in 2008 and the Shanghai World Expo in 2010, thus have been important to
promote Chinese “confident nationalism.” Those international events are important
not only in the sense that those events provides important opportunities to present
China as a modern, confident and responsible power, but also in the sense that in order
to succeed in holding these international event, Chinese are required to be more
open-minded, tolerant and respectful to other cultures and nations while being
confident in Chinese culture and nationality. A number of innocuous slogans such as
“One World, One Dream” [yige shijie, yige mengxiang] and “Be Civilized and Follow
the New Trends” [jiang wenming, shu xinfeng], thus have encouraged citizens to
integrate notions of China’s national greatness with its objectives of re-vamping
China’s image abroad (Barme 2009).
In this “post-Olympics” era, if China’s rising indeed leads Chinese to have
“confident nationalism” instead of “assertive nationalism” as is often assumed,
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China’s rising will certainly serve as a positive factor contributing to both world peace
and regional stability. It will also point to a better relationship between China and
Japan since with “confident nationalism,” it is possible for Chinese, especially
Chinese youths, to be patriotic while being confident and tolerant, but without being
antagonistic towards other countries, including Japan.

5.3 Further Discussions
5.3.1 Limitations
Although this study intends to address the effects of Chinese patriotic education
and Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan in a broader sense, it principally focuses on
the patriotic history curriculum and students in secondary schools of major cities in
Mainland China. The narrowing down of the research subjects, though it could be
justified in theory and compensated by additional second-hand data, suffers from an
insufficient coverage of the whole population. The patriotic education curriculum
embedded in other classes, such as politics and geography classes, for instance, are not
addressed in this study.84 Furthermore, college education which is also involved with a
noticeable patriotic education curriculum is not covered in this study either, while
students in rural China, who may have significant variances from students in big cities,
are also not intentionally sampled in both my questionnaire survey and in-depth
interviews (though some of my respondents once lived in rural areas). Therefore, it
may be problematic to generalize the empirical findings of this study into the whole
population of Chinese youths and the effects of Chinese patriotic education in different
levels.
Also, the foregoing analysis was largely based on the cross-sectional survey data
collected at certain points in time – January 2011 for most in-depth interviews and
early June 2011 for questionnaire survey, which closely followed the ship collision
disputes between China and Japan in the late 2010 and the magnitude-9.0 earthquake,
deadly tsunami and Fukushima nuclear crisis in Japan on March 2011. We thus must
acknowledge that the survey data from both in-depth interviews and questionnaire
survey are more or less affected by those events. Although the effects of these two
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From my survey with secondary school students, it is found that students also learn knowledge
about Japan from other courses, such as geography, politics and foreign language classes. For survey
results, see Q 9 in Appendix II.
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events on Chinese perceptions of Japan might seem to cancel one another out since the
Chinese reaction to the boat collision was generally one of hostility or anger while their
reaction to the March 11, 2011 earthquake, tsunami and nuclear reactor meltdown
tended to be one of sympathy and compassion, these contingent events may somehow
lead to certain levels of instant fluctuations of respondents’ attitudes towards Japan.
What is more, recent media discussions over the bilateral disputes and official
interactions between two governments may also affect students’ opinions on relevant
issues and the bilateral relations. Even though most the bilateral disputes have
remained problems in the background of Sino-Japanese relations, it is undeniable that
the most recent disputes (such as the textbook and territorial disputes) which are
brought to the forefront are more fresh and vivid in students’ minds and thus may tend
to arouse students’ emotional sentiments towards the issues, while disputes which are
fading away and recently less discussed (for example, disputes over Japanese PM’s
visits to Yasukuni Shrine) may be beyond students’ knowledge and attention and thus
lead students to care less or have cooler thinking of the issues.85
Hidden effects may also be brought by the possible political sensitivity of this
research topic in China’s context and particularly in the school circumstances where the
surveys were mainly conducted. With the supervision of the teachers, who were
questionnaire distributors, in classrooms, students tend to be more aware of the
censorship and official propaganda as well as the political sensitivity of the topic.
Although the principle of anonymity has been always emphasized before the interviews
and questionnaire survey, students may still be reluctant to tell their true feelings
especially when they were asked to evaluate their perceptions of Japan and the impacts
of school education and their teachers. So were those students and teachers in my
in-depth interviews. Therefore, we must keep it in mind that the Chinese political
culture and the relationships between students and teachers – respondents and
questionnaire distributors in our survey – may to some degree diminish the validity of
the respondents’ response to both the questionnaire and interviews.
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However, in the sense that most the disputes between China and Japan are supposed to be taught
and discussed in school classes, family, and other occasions. Students’ knowledge about the disputes
may not necessarily affected by the recent media discussions and official interactions.
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5.3.2. Practical propose based on further survey findings
While revealing the relatively weak effects of Chinese patriotic education on
Chinese youths’ perceptions of Japan, this study finds out students’ knowledge about
Japan and the friendly exchanges between China and Japan positively correlates with
students’ perceptions of Japan (See Figure 5.1.).
Figure 5.1. Correlations between Knowledge about Japan and Sino-Japanese relations
and Students’ Perceptions of Japan. (Pearson's Correlation)
Level of knowledge of Japan
1. Japanese modern culture and Japanese products
2. Japanese traditional culture
3. Japan as an island country with limited natural resources and
numerous earthquakes
4. Japanese emperors
5. Meiji Restoration
6. Friendly exchanges between China and Japan in ancient time
7. Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) in China
8. Japan's aggression in modern China
9. Historical disputes between China and Japan
10. Territorial disputes between China and Japan
Notes: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Perceptions of Japan
0.305** (N=640)
0.257** (N=638)
0.147** (N=635)
0.172** (N=638)
0.109** (N=639)
0.219** (N=637)
0.238** (N=640)
0.034 (N=628)
0.038(N=639)
0.010 (N=639)

Moreover, by dividing the 8 cities where the survey was undertaken into two
groups—Shenyang, Nanjing, Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen as cities which have
more contacts with Japan due to economic and historical reasons (for short, “exchange
developed cities”), and Wuhan, Changsha and Chongqing as cities which have fewer
contacts with Japan for geographic and economic reasons (for short, “exchange
undeveloped cities”), it is found that students from these two groups of cities have
significantly different perceptions of Japan.86 It is further found that students from
those “exchange developed cities” overall have better perceptions of Japan than
students from those “exchange undeveloped cities”.87 It is thus clear that exchanges
with Japan also positively correlates with students’ perceptions of Japan. Bilateral
exchanges at all levels, especially among youths, are no doubt the key to improve
students’ perceptions of Japan and the bilateral relations.
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An Independent sample test was conducted to compare the perceptions of students from these two
groups of cities. t (4.88) =638, p=0.000.
87
By comparing the means of students’ perceptions of Japan from these two groups, the mean of
students’ perceptions of Japan from “exchange developed cities” (M=5.69, SD=1.954) is higher than
the mean of students’ perceptions of Japan from “exchange undeveloped cities” (M=4.94,SD=2.082).
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Unfortunately, as my survey and previous public opinion polls have also revealed,
personal experiences are playing the least important role as an information source
about Japan for Chinese students (1.9%, see Figure 4.11).
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This result may be

largely caused by the lack of chances for students to have personal exchanges to Japan
and personal contacts with Japanese people. What is worse, most of the Chinese
students instead get much of their information about Japan through the Internet and
other mass media where there may be more bias and political propaganda hidden. As a
result, it is more likely for Chinese students to develop incomplete – though not
necessarily negative – views of Japan.
On Japan’s side, the previous public polls similarly indicated that most of the
Japanese people also learn information about China through the Internet and Japanese
mass media.89 Due to the recent fact that Japanese perceptions of China have also
been deteriorating, it is highlighted that the more influential role of mass media and
the lack of first-hand information in both sides may be one of the main reasons
contributing to the consistently negative perceptions between Chinese and Japanese
peoples. Based on these findings, this study thus suggests the necessity and very
importance to encourage mutual exchanges between Chinese and Japanese peoples,
especially among youths. Without doubts, only with more first-hand knowledge based
on personal experience, can two peoples have more comprehensive and deeper
understanding of each other.
Finally, although this study emphasizes that the underlying power of the patriotic
history education in Chinese schools is less vigorous than assumed, it is noted that this
does not mean that the study overlooks “the power of silence” in history education. As
Muller (2011: 52) suggested, “in any case, without building up more trust, which
cannot be torpedoed by history education stressing insurmountable differences, a
regional integration is hardly possible.” Thus, the efforts to address the bilateral
disputes over history education between Chinese and Japanese governments and
academia are of great importance though so far they have not yet achieved much
consensus and still have to be developed. Sino-Japanese relations are the key to the
regional stability in Asia and the world peace. It therefore deserves the joint and
long-term efforts from governments, academia and peoples.
88
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Also see survey results on Q7Appendix II.
China Daily and Japanese Genron NPO (2005 -2011), Ibid.
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Appendix 1
(Structured schedule of interviews with students)

Interviewees: secondary school students from Shenzhen and Nanjing
Methods and language: face-to-face and online interviews in Chinese (mandarin).
Duration: no time limit.

[The start of the interview]
Q1. At the mere mention of Japan, what is the first thing you think of?
Q2. How do you perceive Japan?
Q3. What do you know about Japan?
Q4. Where do you learn the above information from about Japan?
Q5. Do you know the history about Japan’s invasion in China in the past? Could you
raise some examples?
Q6. Where do you learn the history about Japan’s invasion of China in the past?
Q7. How did your perception of Japan change after you learned the history about
Japan’s invasion of China in the past?
Q8. Do you know about Japan’s attempts to revise its history textbooks after the
WWII? Where did you learn this?
Q9. How did your perception of Japan change after you learned about Japan’s
attempts to revise its history textbooks?
Q10. Do you know about Japanese Prime Ministers’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine?
Should the Japanese Prime Minister visit Yasukuni Shrine?
Q11. Where did you learn about Japanese Prime Ministers’ visits to the Yasukuni
Shrine?
Q12. How did your perception of Japan change after you learned about Japanese
Prime Ministers’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine?
Q13. What have you been taught about Japan in school classes?
Q14. During which schooling period did you (learn) knowledge about Japan?
Q15. Have you watched any movies or documentaries on Japan’s invasion of China
during wartime in classes? If yes, has your perception of Japan changed due to these
movies and documentaries?
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Q16. Have you participated in any school-organized extra-curricular activities, such
as visiting museums or memorial halls pertaining to Japan’s invasion in China
during wartime? If yes, has your perception of Japan changed due to these
extra-curricular activities?
Q17. What have you learned more from school classes, the negative aspects of Japan
or the positive ones?
Q18. Are school classes the most important source for you to learn about Japan? If
no, what is your most important source for information about Japan?
[The end of the interview]
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Appendix 2
(Questionnaire (English) and Aggregated Survey Results)
Note: 1. The survey was carried out in early June 2011 with secondary schools
students from 9 cities of Mainland China – Shenyang, Xi’an, Beijing,
Shanghai, Nanjing, Wuhan, Changsha, Chongqing, Shenzhen – where
anti-Japanese protests had taken place in 1996 and 2005. However, as the
sample of Xi’an was removed from the total sample, the survey data of the
other 8 cities was analyzed. With a response rate of 89.3%, 643 valid
cases with complete responses were collected. Of these valid cases, 65 are
cases from Beijing, 73 from Chongqing, 79 from Changsha, 87 from
Nanjing, 88 from Shanghai, 90 from Shenyang, 89 from Shenzhen, and 72
from Wuhan.
2. N is for the number of valid cases.
.

Q1. Which grade are you currently in? (N=642, %)
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.

Year 1 in junior high school
Year 2 in junior high school
Year 3 in junior high school
Year 1 in senior high school
Year 2 in senior high school
Year 3 in senior high school

18.1
18.1
13.2
19.9
17.2
13.1

Q2. Have you been studying in the city where you are currently living in?
(N= 641, %)
A. Yes
B. No
C. Others

91.0
9.0
0

Q3. Given a chance to visit Japan, would you like to go? (N=642, %)
A. Yes (continue to answer Q4)
B. No

72.3
22.7

C. Others

5.0

Q4. For what purpose would you like to visit Japan? (N=503, %)
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Travel and shopping
Further education
Understand Japanese culture and society
Make Japanese friends
Others

39.2
11.1
43.3
2.2
4.2
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Q5. How much do you know about Japan and Sino-Japanese relations?

1. Japanese
modern culture
and Japanese
products
2. Japanese
traditional
culture
3. Japan as an
island country
with limited
natural
resources and
numerous
earthquakes
4. Japanese
emperors
5. Meiji
Restoration
6. Friendly
exchanges
between China
and Japan in
ancient time
7. Japanese
Official
Development
Assistance
(ODA) in
China
8. Japan's
aggression in
modern China
9. Historical
disputes
between China
and Japan
10. Territorial
disputes
between China
and Japan

Don’t
Know at
All (%)

48.4

Know
Very
Little
(%)
6.4

1.2

100
(N=643)

24.5

46.5

17.0

3.4

100
(N=642)

27.7

39.5

26.0

4.2

2.5

100
(N=638)

9.2

25.4

35.7

23.6

6.1

100
(N=641)

15.9

26.8

31.3

18.8

7.2

29.1

32.3

26.2

9.2

3.1

100
(N=642)
100
(N=640)

3.0

9.3

26.1

44.0

17.6

100
(N=643)

54.4

25.8

13.8

4.1

1.9

100
(N=631)

24.1

22.9

25.1

19.6

8.3

100
(N=642)

38.3

33.0

21.0

5.9

1.7

100
(N=642)

Know
Very
Well
(%)
16.0

Know
(%)

Somewhat
Know
(%)

28.0

8.6
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Total
(%)

Q6. Which of the following aspects about Japan and Sino-Japanese relations
is most impressive to you? (N = 641, %)
A. Japanese modern culture and Japanese products

41.5

B. Japanese traditional culture

7.8

C. Japan as an island country with limited natural resources and numerous earthquakes

7.5

D. Japanese emperors

1.1

E. Meiji Restoration

1.1

F. Friendly exchanges between China and Japan in ancient time

1.4

G. Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) in China

0

H. Japan's aggression in modern China

30.6

I. Historical disputes between China and Japan

0.5

J. Territorial disputes between China and Japan

2.7

K. Others

5.9

Q7. What is the most important approach for you to learn about Japan?
(N=640, %)
A.
B.
C.
D.

School education (i.e. classes, textbooks, extracurricular activities in schools, etc.)
Internet, TV programs, newspapers, and other mass media.
Experiences of families, relatives and friends.
Personal experiences

E. Others

22.0
69.4
2.7
1.9
4.1

Q8. In which period have you learnt most knowledge about Japan?
Schooling
Period
A. Pre-schooling
B. Primary School
C. Junior High School
D. Senior High School
E. Others

Junior High School Students
(N=317, %)
0.6
12.6
83.0
-3.8

Senior High School Students
(N=325, %)
0.9
3.7
45.2
46.2
0.4

Q9. Through which of the following school classes have you learnt knowledge
about Japan? (Multiple Answers, N=643, %)
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.

History class
Geography class
Politics class
Chinese class
Foreign languages class
Moral cultivation class
Society and sciences class
Military theory class
Others

91.6
58.0
18.8
18.2
4.7
4.7
3.9
2.2
0.9
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Q10. What have you learned more from school classes, the negative aspects of
Japan or the positive ones? (N=640, %)
A.
B.
C.
D.

The positive aspects
Equal
The negative aspects
Not sure

8.1
67.5
22.2
2.2

Q11. Do you think that what you have learnt about Japan from schools is
consistent with what you learnt about Japan out of schools? (N=634, %)
A.
B.
C.
D.

Yes
Some yes, some no
No
Not sure

32.2
61.0
3.3
3.5

Q 12. How did your perceptions of Japan change due to textbooks\ teachers?
Worsened
(%)
Textbooks

35.0

Remained
the same
(%)
43.1

Teachers

24.0

47.4

Improved
(%)

Not Sure
(%)

Total
(%)

17.4

4.5

100 (N=638)

24.2

4.4

100 (N=633)

Q13. Have you joined the following extra-curricular activities organized by
schools? (By city)

Beijing

Chongqing

Changsha

Nanjing

Shanghai

Watch movie or documentary
about Japan's aggression in
modern China (%)
16.9
Not
83.1
Yes

Visit museum or memorial hall about
Japan's aggression in modern China
(%)
55.4

Total

100 (N=65)

100 (N=65)

Not

28.8

76.4

Yes

71.2

23.6

Total

100 (N=73)

100 (N=72)

Not

21.5

62.8

Yes

78.5

37.2

Total

100 (N=79)

100 (N=78)

Not

24.1

21.8

Yes

75.9

78.2

Total

100 (N=87)

100 (N=87)

Not

35.6

65.5

Yes

64.4

34.5

Total

100 (N=87)

100 (N=87)
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44.6

Shenyang

Shenzhen

Wuhan

Not

30

39.5

Yes

70

60.5

Total

100 (N=90)

100 (N=86)

Not

26.1

73

Yes

73.9

27

Total

100 (N=88)

100 (N=86)

Not

36.1

90

Yes

63.9

10

Total

100 (N=72)

100 (N=70)

Q14. Do you agree the following statements after watching
movies/documentaries and visiting museums/memorial halls pertaining to
Japanese aggression in China during wartime?

1. Japanese
militaries were
cruel.
2. Chinese soldiers
were great.
3. The Chinese
should hate the
Japanese.
4. Chinese fellows
who victimized in
the wars should be
mourned forever.
5. Both the Chinese
and Japanese
peoples were
victims in the wars.
6. Take history as
guidance and look
into the future.
7. Love Chinese
motherland and
revive Chinese
nation.
8. Love peace and
fight against the
wars.

Strongl
y Agree
(%)

Agr
ee
(%)

Neutr
al
(%)

Disagre
e (%)

61.4

27.4

9.0

1.4

53.2

24.1

14.9

4.3

24.2

23.4

34.8

61.5

23.3

38.1

Strongl
y
Disagre
e (%)
0.2

Not
Sure
(%)

Total
(%)

0.4

100
(N=511)

1.6

2.0

14.1

1.6

2.0

100
(N=511)
100
(N=509)

11.4

3.2

0.4

0.2

100
(N=507)

24.8

21.0

10.2

4.1

1.8

100
(N=509)

51.3

24.
6

17.5

5.3

0.4

1.0

100
(N=509)

68.5

17.4

12.5

1.4

0.2

0

100
(N=511)

81.4

10.8

6.1

0.8

0.4

0.6

100
(N=511)
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Q15. To what extent, if any, do you dislike Japan in terms of the following
controversial issues between China and Japan?

1. Japanese
aggression in
China during
wartime
2. Japanese
right-wingers’
revisions of
history textbooks
3.Japanese prime
ministers’
visits to
Yasukuni Shrine
4. Japan’s
competition with
China over the
sovereignty of
Diaoyu/Senkaku
Island and East
China Sea

Strongly
Dislike
(%)

Dislik
e
(%)

75.1

69.6

45.3

65.3

Not
Sure
(%)

Total
(%)

0.6

Don’t
Dislik
e at
All
(%)
0.3

0.2

100
(N=643
)

8.7

2.6

0

2.0

100
(N=642
)

13.0

9.8

1.1

5.9

100
(N=640
)

9.0

1.2

0.5

1.1

100
(N=643
)

Somewha
t Dislike
(%)

Slight
ly
Dislik
e (%)

18.0

5.8

17.0

24.8

22.9

Q16. Given permissions to demonstrate in China, will you attend the legal
demonstrations against Japan for the following issues between China and
Japan?
Yes (%)

No (%)

1. Japanese right-wingers’
revisions of history
textbooks

55.6

40.2

4.2

100 (N=639)

2.Japanese prime ministers’
visits to Yasukuni Shrine

38.4

58.7

2.8

100 (N=635)

3.Japan’s competition with
China over the sovereignty
of Diaoyu/Senkaku Island
and East China Sea

60.5

35.8

3.8

100 (N=640)
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Not Sure
(%)

Total
(%)

Q17. Do you agree with the following statements about Japanese?
Strongl
y Agree
(%)

Agr
ee
(%)

Neutr
al
(%)

Disagre
e (%)

27.7

39.2

22.7

3.6

are

29.9

40.9

21.0

2.5

3.4

2.3

Japanese are disciplined

34.5

34.6

20.0

3.9

4.4

2.7

Japanese are polite

Japanese
responsible

Strongl
y
Disagre
e (%)
5.0

Not
Sure
(%)
1.9

Total
(%)

100
(N=643
)
100
(N=643
)
100
(N=641
)

Japanese are impenitent

27.0

18.6

32.0

14.4

3.7

4.4

100
(N=641
)

Japanese are arrogant

27.8

20.7

30.7

13.3

3.7

3.7

100
(N=641
)

Japanese are agressive

44.9

23.7

20.6

5.5

2.8

2.

100

5
(N=641
)

Q18. What perceptions do you have of Japan? (N=640)
Degree
Value
Very Unfavorable

Percent (%)
9.9

1

6.1

2

3.8

Unfavorable

12.3
3

6.1

4

6.2

Moderate

52.2
5

25.0

6

27.2

Favorable

20.4
7

10.6

8

9.8

Very Favorable

4.7

9

2.2

10

2.5

Not sure

0.5
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Appendix 3
(Original Questionnaire in Chinese)

问卷编号：

问卷调查说明
此问卷调查出于本人硕士论文研究的需要，主要目的在于收集有关中学生对
日本的整体认知，以及其认知是否来源于学校教育的数据。
问卷调查采取随机抽样获得样本，答卷人以自愿原则参与。问卷内容主要涉
及答卷人的个人观点和学习经历，不涉及任何与学校和答卷人有关的私人信息。
本人将严格按照问卷调查的有关要求，妥善处理、保管问卷和有关数据，尊重并
维护有关学校和问卷参与者的相关权利。
此问卷包括封面和结语共五页，其中问卷主体题目 18 道，结语附有信息题目
4 道。正常答卷时间约为 10-15 分钟。

问卷制作人： 吴泽映
学习单位：香港岭南大学政治学系
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说明：请仔细阅读以下问题和相关指示，用圆圈标出适合的选项的编号并填写相关答
案。
1. 你目前就读哪个年级？
A. 初中一年级
B. 初中二年级
D. 高中一年级
E. 高中二年级

C. 初中三年级
F. 高中三年级

2. 你一直都在目前所在的城市上学吗？
A. 是
（到目前为止有几年: __________年）
B. 不是 （请说明最近两处曾经上过学的地方：_______省_______市________县/
村; _______省_______市________县/村）
3. 如果有机会让你去日本，你愿意去吗？
A． 愿意
B． 不愿意 （无需回答问题 4）
C． 其他 （请说明：____________________________________）
4. 你去日本最主要出于什么目的？（单选）
A. 游玩和购物
B. 留学深造
C. 认识和体验日本文化
D. 与日本人交流
E. 其他 （请说明：______________________________________）
5. 你对以下有关日本的知识了解有多少？ (请圆圈标出适合的数字来表示你对相应
知识的了解程度。)
非常 了
一般 不了
非常不
了解 解
了解 解
了解
4
3
2
1
A. 日本现代文化和物质文明，如日本 5
漫画、电影、电器、汽车等。
4
3
2
1
B. 日本民族传统文化，如寿司、和服、 5
歌舞伎、相扑等。
4
3
2
1
C. 日本地理知识，如日本是个岛国、 5
资源贫乏、地震多发等。
4
3
2
1
D. 日本社会特征，如保留天皇制度、 5
社会等级观念较强等。
4
3
2
1
E. 日本近代改革的历史，如明治维新 5
等。
5
4
3
2
1
F. 日本近代侵华的历史。
4
3
2
1
G. 日本古代与中国互派使者的友好交 5
往史，如“遣唐使”、“鉴真东渡”等。
4
3
2
1
H. 日 本 战 后 通过 政 府发 展援 助 计 划 5
（ODA）援助中国经济发展。
4
3
2
1
I. 日本右翼战后单方面修改历史教科 5
书、首相参拜靖国神社等事件。
4
3
2
1
J. 日本与中国的主权争端，如钓鱼岛 5
问题。
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6. 你对日本的印象最主要是根据你对日本哪方面知识的了解？（单选）
A. 日本现代文化和物质文明，如日本漫画、电影、电器、汽车等。
B. 日本民族传统文化，如寿司、和服、歌舞伎、相扑等。
C. 日本地理知识，如日本是个岛国、资源贫乏、地震多发等。
D. 日本社会特征，如保留天皇制度、社会等级观念较强等。
E. 日本近代改革的历史，如明治维新等。
F. 日本近代侵华的历史。
G. 日本古代与中国互派使者的友好交往史，如“遣唐使”、“鉴真东渡”等。
H. 日本战后通过政府发展援助计划（ODA）援助中国经济发展。
I. 日本右翼战后单方面修改历史教科书、首相参拜靖国神社等事件。
J. 日本与中国的主权争端，如钓鱼岛问题。
K. 其他 （请说明：________________________________________）
7. 你最主要是通过哪一途径了解到这一方面的信息的？ （单选）
A. 课本教材、课堂和学校组织的课外活动。
B. 网络、电视、报纸和各种课外书籍杂志。
C. 家人、亲戚或朋友的经历和见闻。
D. 自己的亲身经历和见闻。
E. 其他（请说明：__________________________________________）
8. 你在以下哪个阶段接收到了最多有关日本的知识？ （单选）
A. 学前教育
B. 小学
C. 初中
D. 高中
F. 其他 （请说明：_____________________）
9. 你在学校的哪些课堂上接收到了有关日本的知识？（可多选）
A. 历史课 B. 地理课 C. 政治课 D. 语文课 E. 外语课 F. 思想品德课 G.
社会与科学 H. 军事理论课 I. 其他 （请说明：_______）
10. 你觉得你在学校课堂上接收到的更多是有关日本正面的知识，还是负面的知识？
A. 正面的知识
B. 负面的知识
C. 两者相当
D. 不清楚
11. 你觉得你在学校里接收的有关日本的知识跟你在学校外了解到的一致吗？
A. 一致
B. 有些一致，有些不一致
C. 不一致
D. 不清楚
12. 你对日本的印象有没有因为以下两个因素而改变？（请用圆圈标出适合的数字。）
有， 有，
没有
不清
变好 变差
变化
楚
3
2
1
0
A. 学校教科书里有关日本的内容。
2
1
0
B. 老师在课堂上对有关日本的知识的 3
讲解。
13. 你有没有参加过学校或老师组织的以下的课堂活动和课外活动？（请用圆圈标出适
合的数字，并填写有关答案； 若都选择“0”，则无需回答问题 14。
）
有
没有 若有，请列举一例。
0
A. 观看有关日本侵华历史的影片或纪录 1
片。
0
B. 参观与日本侵华历史有关的纪念馆。 1
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14. 你看完这些影片或纪录片（或参观完有关的纪念馆）后，有以下哪种感觉？ （请
用圆圈标出适合的数字来表示你相应感觉的强烈程度。）
非常 强
一般 不强 非常不 没感觉
强烈 烈
强烈 烈
强烈
5
4
3
2
1
0
A. 日本士兵很残忍。
5
4
3
2
1
0
B. 中国军人很伟大。
5
4
3
2
1
0
C. 憎恨日本人。
4
3
2
1
0
D. 缅 怀 战 争 中 遇 难 的 同 5
胞。
4
3
2
1
0
E. 中国人民和日本人民都 5
是战争的受害者。
5
4
3
2
1
0
F. 以史为鉴，面向未来。
4
3
2
1
0
G. 热爱祖国，振兴中国民 5
族。
5
4
3
2
1
0
H. 反对战争，热爱和平。
15. 你对以下日本方面的行为是否反感？（请用圆圈标出适合的数字来表示你的反感程
度。
）
非常 反感 一般 不 反 非常不 不 清
反感
反感 感
反感
楚
5
4
3
2
1
0
A. 日本近代侵华。
4
3
2
1
0
B. 日本右翼单方面修改历史教 5
科书。
5
4
3
2
1
0
C. 日本首相参拜靖国神社。
4
3
2
1
0
D. 日本在钓鱼岛和东海油田等 5
领土主权问题上与中国存在
争议。
16. 如果允许，你会因为以下的事件参加针对日本的抗议、示威、游行等活动吗？（请
用圆圈标出适合的数字，并填写有关答案。）
会
不会 其他 （请说明）
0
A. 日 本右 翼单 方 面修 改历史 教 科 1
书。
1
0
B. 日本首相参拜靖国神社。
0
C. 日本与中国在钓鱼岛和东海油田 1
等领土主权问题上爆发冲突。
17. 你同意以下的说法吗？（请圆圈标出适合的数字来表示你的认同程度。）
非常
同意 一般
不 同 非常
不清楚
同意
同意
意
不同意
5
4
3
2
1
0
日本人待人礼貌。
5
4
3
2
1
0
日本人做事认真。
5
4
3
2
1
0
日本人严守纪律。
5
4
3
2
1
0
日本人不知悔改。
5
4
3
2
1
0
日本人狂妄自大。
4
3
2
1
0
日本人有侵略其他民族 5
的野心。
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18. 你对日本这个国家的整体印象如何？（请用圆圈标出适合的数字。）
非常好
好
一般
不好
非常不好
不清楚
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0

结 语
谢谢支持与合作！
因本人分析数据的需要，请答卷人在完成答卷后，继续回答以下四个有关个人和
所在学校信息的问题：
1). 你所在学校属公立、私立、还是其他（请说明）？
答：

2). 你所在学校属非重点中学还是重点中学（请具体说明是国家重点、省重点、还
是市重点）？
答：

3). 你所在班级属文科班、理科班还是其他（请说明）？
答：

4). 你所在学校采用的历史教科书是由哪个出版社出版？
答： 高中：
初中：
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Appendix 4
I.

Official Documents on Chinese Ideological-Political Education since
1980s, (From the Encyclopedia of Education Law of the People’s
Republic of China [Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiaoyu Fa
Quanshu])
1. Ministry of Education Opinion on Improving and Strengthening Secondary
School Political Education Courses (September 12, 1980) [Jiaoyu Bu Guanyu
Gaijin he Jiaqiang Zhongxue Zhengzhi Ke de Yijian]
2. Opinion of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Propaganda
Department and CCP Central Committee Secretariat Research Office on
Strengthening Patriotic Propaganda Education (July 2, 1983) [Zhonggong
Zhongyang Xuanchuan Bu, Zhonggong Zhongyang Shuji Chu Yanjiu Shi
Guanyu Jiaqiang Aiguozhuyi Xuanchuan Jiaoyu de Yijian]
3. Ministry of Education Notice on Improving and Strengthening the Teaching of
Secondary School History and Geography Courses (August 1, 1983) [Jiaoyu
Bu Guanyu Gaijin Jiaqiang Zhongxue Lishi he Dili Ke Jiaoxue de Tongzhi]
4. Ministry of Education Notice on the Study and Implementation of the
‘Opinion on Strengthening Patriotic Propaganda Education’ (August 24, 1983)
[Jiaoyu Bu Guanyu Xuexi Guanche ‘Guanyu Jiaqiang Aiguozhuyi Xuanchuan
Jiaoyu de Yijian]
5. Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Notice on Reforming the
Teaching of Ideological Character and Political Theory Curricula in Schools
(August 1, 1985) [Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Gaige Xuexiao Sixiang
Pinde he Zhengzhi Lilun Kecheng Jiaoxue de Tongzhi]
6. State Education Commission Notice on Further Expanding the Experiment in
Reforming Secondary School Ideological and Political Education Courses
(Extract) (April 22, 1987) [Guojia Jiaoyu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Jinyibu Kuoda
Zhongxue Sixiang Zhengzhi Ke Gaige Shiyan de Tongzhi (Jielu)]
7. Outline on Secondary School Moral Education (Draft) (August 20, 1988)
[Zhongxue Deyu Dagang (Shixing Gao)] 8. Chinese Communist Party Central
Committee Notice on Reforming and Strengthening Primary and Middle
School Moral Education Work (December 25, 1988) [Zhonggong Zhongyang
Guanyu Gaige he Jiaqiang Zhongxiaoxue Deyu Gongzuo de Tongzhi]
8. Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Notice on Reforming and
Strengthening Primary and Middle School Moral Education Work (December
25, 1988) [Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Gaige he Jiaqiang Zhongxiaoxue
Deyu Gongzuo de Tongzhi]
9. State Education Commission Opinion on Strengthening the Teaching of
Ideological and Political Education and Education on National Conditions in
Primary and Secondary Language, History, Geography, and Other Courses
(November 8, 1989) [Guojia Jiaowei Guanyu Zai Zhongxiaoxue Yuwen, Lishi,
Dili Deng Xueke Jiaoxue Zhong Jiaqiang Sixiang Zhengzhi Jiaoyu he
Guoqing Jiaoyu de Yijian]
10. A Few Opinions on Further Strengthening Primary and Secondary School
Moral Education Work (April 13, 1990) [Guanyu Jinyibu Jiaqiang
Zhongxiaoxue Deyu Gongzuo de Jidian Yijian]
11. State Education Commission Notice on Implementing the Policy of Strictly
Instituting a System for Flag Raising in Primary and Secondary Schools
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According to the ‘People’s Republic of China National Flag Law’ (August 24,
1990) [Guojia Jiaowei Guanyu Shixing ‘Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guoqi
Fa’Yange Zhongxiaoxue Shengjiang Guoqi Zhidu de Tongzhi]
12. State Education Commission Office Opinion on Further Developing Patriotic
Education Activities in Primary and Secondary Schools (April 25, 1991)
[Guojia Jiaowei Bangongting Guanyu Zai Zhongxiaoxue Jinyibu Kaizhan
Aiguozhuyi Jiaoyu Huodong de Yijian]
13. Office of the State Education Commission Notice on Primary and Secondary
School Extracurricular Reading Materials for Education on National
Conditions (June 1, 1991) [Guojia Jiaowei Bangongting Guanyu
Zhongxiaoxue Guoqing Jiaoyu Kewai Yuedu Duwu de Tongzhi]
14. State Education Commission Notice on the Promulgation of the Preliminary
Draft of the ‘General Outline on Strengthening Education in Modern and
Contemporary History and National Conditions’ (August 27, 1991) [Guojia
Jiaowei Guanyu Banfa ‘Zhongxiaoxue Jiaqiang Zhongguo Jindai, Xiandaishi
ji Guoqing Jiaoyu de Zongti Gangyao’ (Chugao) de Tongzhi]
15. Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Propaganda Department, State
Education Commission, Department of Culture, Department of Civil
Administration, Communist Youth League Central Committee, and National
Bureau of Cultural Relics Notice on Fully Utilizing Cultural Relics in the
Implementation of Patriotic Education and Education in Revolutionary
Traditions (August 28, 1991) [Zhonggong Zhongyang Xuanchuan Bu, Guojia
Jiaowei, Wenhua Bu, Minzheng Bu, Gongqingtuan Zhongyang, Guojia Wenwu
Ju Guanyu Chongfen Yunyong Wenwu Jinxing Aiguozhuyi he Geming
Chuantong Jiaoyu de Tongzhi]
16. The Need to Seriously and Earnestly Implement Primary and Secondary
Education on Flag-Raising Activities (October 17, 1991) [Yao Yansu er
Renzhende Jinxing Zhongxiaoxue Shengjiang Qi Huodong de Jiaoyu]
17. State Education Commission Outline on National Defense Education in
Primary and Middle Schools (Draft) (February 19, 1992) [Guojia Jiaoyu
Weiyuanhui Xiaoxue, Chuzhong Guofang Jiaoyu Gangyao (Shixing)]
18. Opinion on Strengthening “Loving the Hometown” and Patriotic Education
in Kindergartens (May 5, 1992) [Guanyu Zai Youeryuan Jiaqiang Ai Jiaxiang,
Ai Zuguo Jiaoyu de Yijian]
19. Outline on the Implementation of Patriotic Education (Chinese Communist
Party Central Committee, August 8, 1994) [Aiguo Zhuyi Jiaoyu Shishi
Gangyao]
II.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Chinese Secondary School Histroy Textbooks and Curricular
Standards Examined
Chuji Zhongxue Keben Zhongguo Lishi, People’s Education Press, 1985.
9 Nian Yiwu Jiaoyu 3 Nian Zhi Chuji Zhongxue Jiaokeshu: Zhongguo Lishi,
People’s Education Press, 1995.
Putong Gaozhong Kecheng Biaozhun Shiyan Jiaokeshu: Lishi, People’s
Education Press, 2008.
9 Nian Yiwu Jiaoyu Quanrizhi Chuji Zhongxue Lishi Jiaoxue Dagang,
People’s Education Press, 1992.
9 Nian Yiwu Jiaoyu Quanrizhi Chuji Zhongxue Lishi Jiaoxue Dagang,
People’s Education Press, 2000.
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6. Quanrizhi Zhongxue Lishi Jiaoxue Dagang, People’s Education Press, 1986.
7. Lishi Kecheng Biaozhun, The Press of Beijing Normal University, 2011.
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